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Comment
File-sharing Tools and Copyright Law: A Study of
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation and MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
Robyn Axberg*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2003, the Recording Industry Association of
America ("RIAA") declared war against file-swappers across the
country. 1 Phase one included discovering the identities of individuals
responsible for large amounts of Internet piracy 2 through the use of
subpoenas issued pursuant to a controversial provision of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). 3 The subpoenas compelled
* J.D. expected May 2005. To my family, especially my husband Michael, thank you for
your unwavering love, encouragement, and support throughout the writing process and beyond. I
would also like to extend my thanks to Loyola's Professor Brett Frischmann for sharing his
reasoned insights on this subject and his passion for the field of cyberlaw generally. Finally, I am
grateful for the dedication, patience, and hard work of the Loyola University Chicago Law
Journaleditors and members, especially Leah Wardak and Gia Fontd.
1. Janet Rausa Fuller & Dave Newbart, Music Industry Goes After Ordinary Young Listeners,

CHI. SUN-TIMES, http://www.suntimes.com/output/music/cst-nws-music20.html (July 20, 2003).
2.

See Doris Estelle Long, E-Business Solutions to Internet Piracy: A Practical Guide, 740

PLI/PAT 769, 776 (2003) (defining piracy as the "unauthorized reproduction of virtually identical
copies of copyrighted works").
3.

Andrea L. Foster, Recording Industry Forces University To Identify Students Suspected of

Music Piracy, UNIV. OF WYOMING RESNET NEWS, at http://uwadmnweb.uwyo.edu/
resnet/News/news-030714-RIAA.htm (July 14, 2003); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2000)
(allowing copyright owners to have subpoenas issued by a clerk without review by a judge). For
more information on the DMCA provision, see DANIEL L. BRENNER ET AL., 2 CABLE
TELEVISION § 18:24 (2003), and see also BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., 65 PATENT,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT 606 (2003) (recounting the decision upholding the DMCA subpoena
process). Verizon has argued that this provision of the DMCA is overly broad and is
unconstitutional because it violates its users' freedom of speech and is contrary to Article III's
case and controversy provision. In re Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 249, 262
(D.D.C. 2003); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that judicial power extends to cases
and controversies). The company requested a stay until a scheduled appeal in September when it
planned to challenge the law in court; however, that request was denied, and Verizon has handed
over four names to the RIAA. In re Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 6, 6 (D.D.C.
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service providers and universities, including Loyola University4
Chicago, to disclose the identities of some users on their systems.
Amidst controversy, Loyola complied with the subpoena, releasing the
identities of two alleged file-swapping roommates enrolled in a summer
session. 5 The RIAA then initiated phase two of the new war by filing
suit against 261 individuals who allegedly traded copyrighted music
over the Internet. 6 The RIAA's new strategy-suing individual fileswappers-followed an unsuccessful suit against a prominent supplier
7
of file-swapping software.
United States District Judge Stephen V. Wilson of the Central
District of California stunned the music industry and the public in April
2003 by dismissing copyright infringement claims brought by members
of the entertainment industry against manufacturers and distributors of
software designed to enable file-swapping. 8 This decision directly
contrasts with another federal court decision, decided in June 2003 by
the Seventh Circuit, that affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction
against the file-trading software manufacturer Aimster for similar

2003); Christopher Stern, Verizon Identifies Download Suspects, WASH. POST, June 6, 2003, at
E5, available at LEXIS, News Library, Washington Post File. See infra Part V.C.1 for a
discussion of the DMCA fast-track subpoena provision.
4. Robert Becker & Angela Rozas, Music Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; 2 Students' Names
Are Handed Over; Lawsuit Possible, CHI. TRIB., July 16, 2003, at Cl, available at 2003 WL
59284135.
5. Id.; Music Industry Goes After Loyola U. Students: University Hands Over Names of
Suspected Students, NBC5.coM, at http://www.nbc5.com/entertainment/2335598/detail.html
(July 16, 2003) [hereinafter Music Industry Goes After Students]. An NBC poll conducted at the
same site revealed that only 34% of the 1505 polled believed it was "appropriate for Loyola U. to
turn over student names to music industry lawyers suing over illegal downloading." Id. For a
scathing critique of Loyola's compliance from an internal source, see John C. Thomas, Editorial,
RAMBLERMANIA.COM, at http://www.ramblermania.com/edit803.htm (Aug. 8, 2003). However,
given the clear mandate of the DMCA provision, that "[t]he subpoena shall authorize and order
the service provider receiving the notification and the subpoena to expeditiously
disclose ... information sufficient to identify the alleged infringer" and the unsuccessful
challenges to the provision by Verizon, Loyola had little choice but to comply with the provision.
17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(3) (2000); In re Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d at 262; see also
infra Part V.C. 1 (discussing the DMCA fast-track subpoena provision in greater detail).
6. John
Borland,
RIAA
Sues 261
File Swappers, CNET
NEWS.COM,
at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023_3-5072564.html (Sept. 8, 2003). According to Borland, "The
lawsuits mark the first time that copyright laws have been used on a mass scale against individual
Internet users." Id.
7. John Borland, Judge: File-swapping Tools Are Legal, CNET NEws.coM, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-998363.html (Apr. 25, 2003).
8. Id. (referring to MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal.
2003)); see also Lawrence Iser & James Toma, Battling Digital Piracy, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 20,
2003, at Cl (predicting victory for record companies).
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activities. 9 The two decisions differ in their determinations of whether
file-sharing software is capable of substantial noninfringing use, as well
as whether a company must know of specific instances of copyright
infringement to be held liable under a contributory theory of copyright
infringement.' 0
Internet piracy has exploded in recent years, due to rather modem
Downloading an MP3 file, 12 for
technological advancements.1 1
example, is easy, cheap, and provides an undiminished copy of the
original work. 13 Compression software makes digital copies of music
files less cumbersome to store, and thus an attractive alternative to even
the casual personal computer user. 14 The recording industry has
suffered large losses at the hands of music pirates; it estimates an
industry loss of $4.2 billion in 2001.15 In 2002, file-trading software
users downloaded more than three billion files through peer-to-peer
networks. 16

9. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 656 (7th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Aimster II],
aff'g 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002) [hereinafter Aimster I] (consolidating eleven cases
originating from across the country).
10. Borland, supra note 7, at 3.
11. Long, supra note 2, at 775. The prevalence of Internet use has spurred a corresponding
increase in intellectual property crimes generally. JOHN J. FALVEY, JR. & AMY M. MCCALLEN,
2 INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE § 26:6 (2003). Intellectual property crimes include not only
copyright infringement but also theft of trade secrets and trademark infringement. Id.
12. See Matthew C. Mousley, Note, Peer-to-Peer Combat: The Entertainment Industry's
Arsenal in Its War on Digital Piracy, 48 VILL. L. REV. 667, 670 (2003) (defining MP3 as "a
technology that allows digital audio recording to be compressed" into smaller files).
13. Long, supra note 2, at 780-81.
14. Matthew James Fantaci, Note, Digital Dilemma: Could the DigitalMillennium Copyright
Act Have Inadvertently Exempted Napster and Its Progenyfrom Liability?, 62 LA. L. REV. 643,
643 (2002).
15. Mousley, supra note 12, at 671. Internet piracy does not just impact the music industry
but affects virtually all types of intellectual property, including software, movies, and books. Id.
at 669-74 (outlining problems and challenges posed by online piracy). For example, the latest
Harry Potter book is easily accessible on file-swapping services. Paul Festa, Latest Potter Book
Scanned, Swapped, CNET NEWs.CoM, at http://news.com.com/2100-1025_3-1020984.html
(June 25, 2003) (stating that some predict that the availability of Harry Potter online represents
the "harbinger of nascent Napsterization of the book publishing industry"); see also New York
Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (securing to authors rights in digital reproductions
of their works separate from the right of publication). For an example impacting the movie
industry, the FBI's Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property Squad identified an individual
distributing pirated copies of The Hulk. David Becker, Copyright Infringement Bad; Hulk
Smash!, CNET NEWS.COM, at http://news.com.com/2100-1026_3-1021005.html (June 25, 2003)
(reporting that "[b]ootleg copies of major films, such as The Matrix Reloaded often begin
circulating on the Internet before the movie hits theaters").
16. Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at CI (citing statement made by Rep. Howard L. Berman on
September 26, 2002).
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Until recently, copyright holders have been extremely successful in

enforcing their rights against third parties that manufacture or distribute
file-trading software. 17 For example, in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,

Inc., the record companies successfully obtained an injunction against
the popular file-trading service. 18 Despite such success, Internet piracy
of copyrighted materials persists as a mainstream activity. 19 Offenders
are often members of the general public with no discernable class
delineation. 20 Psychologically, the public disassociates online theft
from the actual, physical taking of the work and perceives little risk
associated with the behavior. 21 Furthermore, the public is accustomed

to receiving musical works online free of charge, making it very
difficult to charge for an online distribution system. 22 Also, until
recently, copyright owners have been reluctant to sue individuals for
23
fear of alienating their client base.
The Comment evaluates whether file-swapping software distributors
should be subject to copyright liability. 24 Part II of this Article will
17. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Aimster I, 252 F.
Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. I11.
2002); UMG Recordings, Inc., v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). In addition to the copyright holders comprised of songwriters and music
publishers, the RIAA has also initiated lawsuits and issued statements on behalf of its music
industry members. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc.,
180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
18. Napster,239F.3dat 1011.
19. Jeffrey L. Dodes, Beyond Napster; Beyond the United States: The Technological and
International Legal Barriers to On-line Copyright Enforcement, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 279,
279 (2002-2003) (stating that Napster was a "worldwide phenomenon with 65 million software
downloads and 16.9 million unique users as of February 2001"). The trend continues today. A
recent Google search revealed 66.7 million hits to a search for "free music" and 1.7 million hits
for "Napster." Google Inc., Search Results, at http://www.google.com (last visited Oct. 17,
2003). Likewise, a Yahoo! search found 26.8 million hits to "free music" and 1.6 million hits for
"Napster." Yahoo! Inc., Search Results, at http://www.yahoo.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2003).
Admittedly, not every website listed is a haven for music piracy; some represent legitimate feebased websites, while others engage in commentary about the online music debate.
20. Long, supra note 2, at 775 (explaining that Internet piracy is prevalent among members of
the general public, appealing not only to college kids or "techno-geeks," but even to "grey-haired
grannies," who download copyrighted sewing patterns or recipes).
21. Id. at 781 ("People who would never engage in shoplifting have no apparent compunction
in making and distributing illegal downloads of copyrighted songs."). For more information
about the social and psychological behaviors associated with file-sharing, see Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the FileSwapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505 (2003).
22. Long, supra note 2, at 786 ("Once customers have become used to free music... it is
more difficult to develop a digital subscription service that will meet the demands of these
customers, while maintaining acceptable profit levels for content providers.").
23. Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at CIO (stating that winning in court is expensive and suing
individuals carries public relations risks).
24. See infra Part IV (arguing that the imposition of liability to the purveyors of file-trading
software is inappropriate).
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outline the historical evolution of copyright law and its relationship to
emerging forms of technology. 25 Then, Part III will explore two federal
court cases, In re Aimster Copyright Litigation26 and MGM, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.,27 which diverge not only in their ultimate determinations
of copyright liability but also in their applications of pertinent legal
concepts. 2 8 Part IV will analyze the problem of third-party copyright
infringement liability in connection with file-trading tools, ultimately
29
arguing that the reasoning employed by the Grokster court is correct.
Finally, Part V will suggest strategies for copyright holders to protect
their intellectual property rights in the context of a world in which filetrading software is legal.3 °

II. BACKGROUND
This Part begins with a discussion of the origin and goals of
copyright law. 3 1 Next, this Part examines third-party liability, including
the necessary elements and underlying policy rationale. 32 This Part then
inspects decisions shaping copyright law, most notably the Supreme
33
Court's decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios.
Next, this Part examines copyright law in an online context. 34 This Part
then considers the DMCA enacted by Congress in 199835 and discusses
the application of the DMCA, focusing on A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc.36 Finally, this Part appraises the current state of the
struggle between copyright holders, developers, and distributors of file37
swapping technologies.

25. See infra Part H (discussing the evolution of copyright law in relation to emerging
technologies).
26. See infra Part III.A (examining the Aimster I and Aimster H decisions).
27. See infra Part IL.B (outlining the court's analysis in Grokster).
28. See infra Part III.C (pinpointing the areas of contention in the Aimster H and Grokster
decisions).
29. See infra Part IV (exploring the legal arguments and policy considerations of third-party
copyright infringement liability as it applies to file-swapping software).
30. See infra Part V (proposing business, educational, and technological strategies to protect
copyrighted works online).
31. See infra Part MI.A (discussing the advent of copyright law).
32. See infra Part II.B (exploring the origin and early developments of third-party theories of

liability for copyright infringement).
33. See infra Part IH.C. (examining early decisions shaping copyright law, including Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
34. See infra Part II.D (considering the application of copyright law in cyberspace).
35. See infra Part II.E (studying the attributes of the DMCA).
36. See infra Part II.F (delving into the application of the DMCA and reviewing A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)).
37. See infra Part II.G (appraising the developments post Napster).
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A. Fundamentalsof CopyrightLaw
Copyright law is embodied in statute, pursuant to the congressional
38

power over the intellectual property arena granted in the Constitution.

Liability attaches where an actor violates one of the exclusive rights
given to the copyright holder, or where an actor aids another in
infringing behavior. 3 9 Yet, because the copyrighted materials and
have value to the public, various exceptions to the
copying technologies 40
exclusive rights exist.

1. Origin of Copyright Law
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to
grant exclusive rights to inventors and artists for the purpose of
advancing science and the arts. 4 1 The Framers did not question the
wisdom of this constitutional provision; indeed, they passed it with little
controversy. 42 Congress has the discretion to determine the length of
time a copyright will last, as well as the scope of the rights. 43 As a
result, Congress has enacted various copyright acts, granting a bundle of
exclusive rights to copyright holders. 44 These rights are not unlimited
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); see also infra Part II.A.1 (outlining
the origin of copyright law).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (allocating to copyright holders certain exclusive rights); see also
infra Part II.A.2 (describing bases for copyright liability).
40. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the fair use defense); infra Part I.C.I (discussing the
staple article of commerce doctrine).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). The purpose behind this provision of the
Constitution was to encourage scientific and artistic endeavors. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546, 555 (1973).
42.

THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 268 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., First Signet

Classic Prtg., Penguin Books 2003). As Mr. Madison noted:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has
been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of common law. The right to
useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good
fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot
separately make effectual provisions for either of the cases, and most of them have
anticipated the decision of this point by laws passed at the instance of Congress.
Id.

43. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1 (1829). The period of time protected under copyright law
began at fourteen years with the first act in 1790, but Congress gradually extended the time period
to the life of the author plus seventy years, with the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). See AMY MASCIOLA, TIMELINE: A HISTORY OF
COPYRIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES, at http://www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/timeline.html (last

modified Nov. 22, 2002) (tracking the evolution of copyright law in the United States).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (allocating to copyright holders the right to reproduce their work,
make derivative works, distribute copies of the work, and perform the work). Notably, the 1909
version of the copyright act also extended the protection to musical compositions. Act of March,
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and must yield to the overall purpose of copyright law: to promote art
and science, as statutorily enumerated.4 5 Thus, the Constitution and
these early congressional enactments provided the basis of modem
46
copyright law.

2. Liability Pursuant to the Copyright Act
There are three principal ways to establish liability for copyright
infringement: 1) direct liability, 2) contributory liability, and 3)
vicarious liability. 4 7 Direct liability is determined by a strict liability
standard, making issues of knowledge or notice irrelevant to the
outcome. 4 8 To establish a case of direct infringement, a plaintiff must
4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (granting exclusive rights to copyright holders). However,
Congress noted:
The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection accorded to music has
been to give the composer an adequate return for the value of his composition, and it
has been a serious and difficult task to combine the protection of the composer with the
protection of the public, and to so frame an act that it would accomplish the double
purpose of securing to the composer an adequate return for all use made of his
composition and at the same time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies,
which might be founded upon the very rights granted to the composer for the purpose
of protecting his interest.
H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909).
45. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-121 (2002) (limiting rights of copyright owners). The limited duration
and limited rights of copyright protection serve to uphold the public interest by ensuring that the
work enters the "public domain."
LEE A. HOLLAAR, LEGAL PROTECTION OF DIGITAL
INFORMATION ch. 1:1.B (2002), available at http://digital-law-online.info/lpdil.0/treatise4.html
(last visited Nov. 20, 2003). According to Hollaar:
Federal copyright can be viewed as a bargain between the creator of the writing or
invention and the people, as represented by the federal government. In trade for
protection for a limited term (and the ability to commercially exploit the writing or
invention during that time because of that protection), the creator lets the public have
all rights to the writing or invention after the term of protection ends. The writing or
invention enters the "public domain," where anybody can do whatever he or she wishes
with it. (Since Congress continues to extend the term of copyright protection, there are
some that question whether this original bargain theory holds today.)
Id. See JOHN KENNEDY ET AL., Copyright: Foundations and Progress, in I INTERNET LAW AND
PRACTICE § 12:9 (2003) (enumerating many of the limitations available under the DMCA,
including "fair use, first sale doctrine," library specific provisions, computer caching, and
educational uses).
46. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) (noting that copyright law is
entirely statutory, dependent solely on Congressional statute enacted pursuant to Constitutional
grant).
47. See KENNEDY ET AL, supra note 45, § 12:9; RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY § 1:32 (3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter NIMMER, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY];
48. KENNEDY ET AL., supra note 45, § 12:9 (explaining that strict liability is the standard for
direct infringement; the intent of the actor is irrelevant to finding infringement); NIMMER,
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 47, § 1:32. In an online context, it may be difficult to
distinguish between direct and third-party theories of infringement, and in fact, the same party
may be liable under both theories. NIMMER, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 47, § 15:66.
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prove: 1) her ownership of the copyright associated with the work; and
2) violation of a reserved use, such as copying the work without
49
authorization.
Contributory liability and vicarious liability are third-party theories of

liability, affixing liability on one party for the infringing acts of
another. 50 In contrast with direct liability, third-party theories do not
follow strict liability; rather, they require some element of knowledge or
inducement. 5 1 Direct liability is relevant to third-party theories because,
as a threshold matter, for a third party to be responsible, there must be a
direct violation of one of the exclusive rights granted by copyright
law. 52 This aspect of third-party liability is also significant because
some of the defenses available to a direct infringer may be relevant in
determining whether the assignment of third-party liability is
appropriate in a given case. 53 In fact, many third-party liability cases
49. Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
50. See Emily E. Larocque, Casenote, No Free Music: Effect of A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc. on the Music Industry and Internet Copyright Law, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 767, 772
(2001) (characterizing contributory liability as the relationship between the defendant and the act
of direct infringement, and vicarious liability as the relationship between the defendant and the
party directly infringing).
51. NIMMER, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 48, §§ 1:32, 15:66; RAYMOND T.
NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW § 4:47 (1996) [hereinafter NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW].
Determining whether direct liability or third-party theories apply sometimes can be difficult,
especially in an online context.
Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding no cause of
action for direct liability, but finding that a cause of action exists under third-party liability
theories), and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1146 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (same), with Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 512-14
(N.D. Ohio 1997) (determining that although images were uploaded to the system by third
parties, the defendants were directly and vicariously liable for copyright infringement), and
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 554 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (same).
Furthermore, a party may simultaneously be guilty of both direct and indirect infringement. See,
e.g., Creative Labs, Inc. v. Cyrix Corp., No. C. 97-0912CW, 1997 WL 337553, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
May 7, 1997) (finding that directly copying software onto a website constituted direct
infringement, as well as contributory liability for providing resources and encouraging others to
download copyrighted software).
52. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Secondary
liability for copyright infringement does not exist in the absence of direct infringement by a third
party." (citing Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1371)); NIMMER, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note
47, § 1:32.
53. See NIMMER, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 48, § 1:32 (discussing the relevance
of infringement defenses to third-party cases). For example, in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., much of the Court's analysis focused on the affirmative defense of
fair use as applied to the activities of the end users of VCRs. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-55 (1984); see also Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v.
Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (evaluating the portable
MP3 player, called Rio, and determining that the end users of the product were engaged in a
private, fair use, thereby invalidating any claim of third-party liability for the manufacturer); infra
notes 106-09 and accompanying text (discussing the treatment of fair use in the Sony case).
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revolve around direct liability and the defenses available to the direct
54
infringers.

3. Fair Use Defense
Ultimately, copyright law struggles to achieve a meaningful balance
between public access or use and an individual's protection of his or her
work. 55 The concept of fair use reflects this philosophy by allowing

some use of copyrighted materials. 56 Fair use provides an affirmative
defense to a claim of copyright infringement. 5 7 This defense applies
58
equally to use of materials in an online context.
To determine whether the fair use defense applies, Congress has set
forth a four factor standard: 1) the nature of the use, particularly
whether it is commercial or personal in nature, 2) the nature of the
protected work, 3) the extent that the work was copied, and 4) the
potential economic effect on the market. 59 Although Congress intended
54. E.g., Sony, 464 U.S. 417; Napster, 239 F.3d 1004; see also NIMMER, COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 47, § 1:32 ("[S]ome cases involving allegations of indirect
infringement... focus[ ] on whether the third party's actions infringed the copyright or [were]
protected under some copyright law doctrine.").
55. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55 (considering the fair use defense, evaluating the societal benefit
of increased public access to broadcast programs through time-shifting practice enabled by
VCRs).
56. KENNEDY ET AL., supra note 45, § 12:17 ("The rationale underlying the fair use doctrine
is to permit the dissemination of original works of expression, where such dissemination would
further learning and the free exchange of information and ideas without unfairly impairing the
present or future economic value of the author's work."). For example, the Copyright Act allows
use for purposes of "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ....scholarship, or research."
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002).
57. KENNEDY ET AL., supra note 45, § 12:17; see also Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (applying the fair use defense to a charge of copyright
infringement).
58. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW, supra note 51, § 4:47; see, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
F.A.C.T.Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1526 (D. Colo. 1995) (finding Internet postings made for
the purpose of criticism, comment, or research fell within the fair use doctrine).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). The statute states:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Id. Fair use initially emerged as a common-law doctrine, which Congress later codified in the
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fair use to be fact-intensive with no bright line distinctions, the test is
vague and can be difficult to apply. 60 Courts often evaluate these
factors inconsistently, and the evaluative process necessarily involves
subjective determinations. 6 1 Fair use relates to theories of contributory
or vicarious liability because if courts deem the activity a fair use, then
62
no liability to the software manufacturer may result.
B. Third-party Liability

Because the Copyright Act contained no provisions for third-party

63
liability, contributory and vicarious theories emerged in the courts.

1. Contributory Liability
Contributory liability holds a defendant accountable for actions that
aid or encourage copyright infringement. 64 A contributory liability
claim has two elements: 1) knowledge and 2) material contribution to
the direct infringer's activities. 65 Third parties satisfy the first element
66
if they "know or have reason to know" of direct infringement.
Therefore, a defendant may be liable with actual or constructive
67
knowledge of the infringing activity.

1976 version of the copyright law. See Act for General Revision of the Copyright Law, Pub. L.
No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C § 107). The
statutory list of factors is nonexclusive; courts may freely consider other factors, although in
practice, they rarely do. 17 U.S.C. § 107; KENNEDY ET AL., supra note 45, § 12:17 ("Courts
often weigh [fair use] factors differently, and may introduce additional factors to their analysis as
well (although they rarely do), in the course of conducting what is typically a highly fact-specific
inquiry, with a modicum of subjectivity.").
60. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
61. KENNEDY ET AL., supra note 45, § 12:17 ("In practice, fair use is one of the grayest areas
of copyright law.").
62. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (exploring the role of direct infringement in
a third-party context).
63. Charles S. Wright, Comment, Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading Vicarious Liability
for Copyright Infringement into the DigitalMillennium Copyright Act of 1998, 75 WASH L. REV.

1005, 1009-10 (2000); see infra Part IB.1 (describing contributory liability); infra Part 11.B.2
(describing vicarious liability).
64. NIMMER, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 47, § 15:66; Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry

Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
65. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971).

66. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 (quoting Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods.,
Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845, 846 n.29 (11 th Cir. 1990)).
67. See Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11 th Cir. 1987); Gershwin Publ'g, 443 F.2d at
1162.
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The second element of contributory liability requires material
contribution from the defendant. 68
However, courts have not
adequately or consistently defined "material contribution," making
contributory liability difficult to evaluate. 69 For example, the Ninth
Circuit characterized material contribution as providing facilities used
in the infringement, which represents the lowest threshold for
establishing liability. 70 In contrast, some courts, like the Second Circuit
in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,

characterize material contribution as substantial
participation in the
71
activity, which is a markedly higher standard.

2. Vicarious Liability
A second form of third-party liability is vicarious liability, which
began as a common-law doctrine. 72 Vicarious liability emerged as a
modification of the common-law tradition of respondeat superior, 73 but
in the realm of copyright infringement, it extends beyond the
employment setting. 7 4 Vicarious liability requires the plaintiff to
establish two elements: 1) the right and ability to control another's
actions and 2) a direct financial benefit derived from the infringing
activities. 75

68. NIMMER, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 47, § 15.66 (requiring "proof that
defendant induced, caused, or materially contributed to the infringement"). See generally Design
Craft Fabric Corp. v. K-Mart Corp., No. 98 C 5698, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19630, at *11 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 21, 1999) ("[T]there are two types of contributing infringement: one, where theft is
personal conduct that forms part of or furthers the infringment and two, where there is
contribution of goods which are means to infringe.").
69. Larocque, supra note 50, at 771.
70. NIMMER, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 47, § 15.66 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v.
Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)).
71. Gershwin Publ'g, 443 F.2d at 1162; NIMMER, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 47,
§ 15.66 (citing Gershwin Publ'g, 443 F.2d at 1162); see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom OnLine Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (applying a
higher threshold determination of material contribution).
72. Wright, supra note 63, at 1008.
73. The tort docrtine of respondeat superior (meaning "let the superior make answer") holds
"an employer or principal liable for the employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the
scope of employment or agency." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 609 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
74. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
Fonovisa,76 F.3d at 262).
75. NIMMER, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 47, § 15.66; Wright, supra note 63, at
1011 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963)). Shapiro
was the first case to establish the dual criteria required to establish vicarious liability. See
Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307 (enumerating the test for establishing vicarious liability).
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Courts apply the control element of the test broadly: a court must
76
simply find that there is an ability to control the direct infringer.
Courts have found that the control element turns on the continuing
relationship between the parties. 77 In fact, mere retention of a
contractual ability to restrict the activities of the direct infringer is
sufficient to find control.7 8
By contrast, courts traditionally have interpreted the direct financial
benefit element of the test narrowly, requiring that the benefit conferred
be conditioned upon the infringing activity. 7 9 However, modem courts
interpret the financial benefit element expansively: a party need not
receive actual payment for the product or service, but rather if the
80
infringement brings in customers, then financial benefit exists.
Two lines of cases are relevant in the context of vicarious liability:
the "landlord-tenant cases" and the "dance hall cases." 8 1 These cases
represent a spectrum of liability. 82 The dance hall owners' relationship
with the people they hire to supply music to paying customers is closely
analogous to an employment relationship and easily fits the model of
vicarious liability. 8 3 On the other hand, a landlord who receives fixed

rents from tenants regardless of the tenants' activities and who does not
participate in the tenants' infringing behaviors will not be subject to
84
vicarious liability.
76. Wright, supra note 63, at 1012. For an expansive description of how the control element
has evolved to establish vicarious liability, see id. passim. Wright traces the evolution of the
control element of the Shapirotest, finding authority split. Id. at 1013-18. The narrow end of the
spectrum requires the defendant actually to control the other party's behavior. See RCA Ariola
Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 781 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying the control
element narrowly). For legal control, the retention of a contractual right, for example, is
sufficient to establish this element. See Gershwin Publ'g, 443 F.2d at 1163 (finding "no formal
power to control" but allowing the mere possibility of control to satisfy the element).
77. Wright, supra note 63, at 1012.
78. Id. at 1018.
79. NIMMER, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 47, § 15.66.
80. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1996)).
81. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 n.18 (1984); see
also Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262.
82. Sony, 464 U.S. at 437 n.18.
83. Id.; Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262. The "dance hall cases" involve hiring an infringing supplier
of music to entertain paying customers in the establishment. E.g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay
State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n., 554 F.2d 1213, 1214 (1st Cir. 1977); Dreamland
Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929); KECA Music,
Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 75 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
84. Sony, 464 U.S. at 437 n.18; Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262. The "dance hall cases," where there
was liability, contrast with the "landlord-tenant cases," in which liability is not triggered because
the landlord leasing the premises does not participate in the infringing acts and receives a fixed
rent regardless of the infringing activities. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir.
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C. Shaping Copyright Law in the Courts

Copyright law continually struggles to adjust to developing
technology. 85 The invention of the printing press created the initial
need for copyright law. 86 Since then, the emergence of typewriters,
photocopying machines, audiocassette recorders, player pianos,
teleprompters, and cameras maintained copyright law's presence within
the court system. 87 With each new invention, Congress and the courts
must determine the appropriate balance between freedom of expression
88
and technological improvements in the ability to copy and distribute.
Generally, the judiciary prefers to defer to Congressional
determination. 89 Nonetheless, some cases have attempted to apply
90
copyright law in new situations, with variant results.
1. Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine and Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, the Supreme
Court held that the VCR qualified as a staple article of commerce
because it was capable of "substantial noninfringing uses" and, thus,
Sony was not contributorily liable. 9 1 Defendant Sony manufactured and
1938) (holding that the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, without more, was insufficient
to trigger vicarious liability).
85. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 430-31 (1984) (describing the correlative effect of
technological innovation on copyright law).
86. Id. at 430 n.12. In 1710, British Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne, the first English
copyright law, in response to the proliferation of printers as a result of the advent of the printing
press. HOLLAAR, supra note 45, ch. 1:1 .A, at 3 (noting that the statute's full name was "An act
for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or
purchasers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned").
87. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n.11.
88. Id.at430n.12.
89. Id. at 431; see, e.g.,Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414 (1974) (stating
that "[dietailed regulation of these relationships.., must be left to Congress"); Fortnightly Corp.
v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1968) ("We take the Copyright Act of
1909 as we find it."); White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 147 F. 226, 227 (2d Cir.
1906) (stating that "the law of copyright is a creature of statute"); Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1973) ("[T]he courts are now precluded, both by the
Act and by the nature of the judicial process, from contriving pragmatic or compromise solutions
which would reflect the legislature's choices of policy and its mediation among the competing
interests.")
90. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 456 (concluding that Sony's new technology, the VCR, would not
trigger copyright liability). But see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1029
(9th Cir. 2001) (assigning copyright liability to Napster for file-trading software).
91. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456. The district court originally denied relief to the copyright holders,
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 469 (C.D. Cal. 1979), but
was reversed on appeal, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 977
(9th Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court decided the case with a narrow five-to-four margin, and over
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sold a novel piece of technology, the Betamax VCR.9 2 Many of the end
users who bought the VCR utilized the technology to record television
93
programs, which often were copyrighted.
At the time of Sony, copyright law was silent on the issue of thirdparty liability. 9 4 However, the Court went on to apply and analyze
contributory and vicarious theories of liability. 9 5 Of great significance

in its determination that Sony was not contributorily liable was the
relationship between Sony and the end user, which was limited to the
sale itself.96 For courts to justly apply contributory liability, the Court
indicated that a continued relationship between the parties was
necessary, such that the defendant has control over the use or
infringement. 97
The Court determined that mere constructive

a strong dissent. Sony, 464 U.S. at 418, 456-57. The staple article of commerce doctrine first
applied in the patent context. Id. at 440 & n.20. Although the Sony Court was the first to apply
the doctrine in the copyright arena, the Court compared the VCR to a camera and photocopying
machine, implicitly indicating precedent for the acceptance of technologies that replicate. See id.
at 456.
92. Sony, 464 U.S. at 422-23. The Betamax is a VCR (videocassette recorder). The Sony
opinion refers to this technology as a Video Tape Recorder. Id. at 422. This Article will utilize
the term "VCR" to refer to the technology generally. The Betamax consists of three components:
1) a tuner, noteworthy because the VCR may tune to a station independent of the television,
allowing for recording one station while simultaneously watching another; 2) a recorder, which
records the signals received onto the tape; and 3) an adapter, which converts the recorded sounds
and images into signals that can be utilized and displayed by the television. Id.
93. Id. at 420.
94. Id. at 434. The Court explored patent law, finding express language requiring liability for
anyone who "actively induces infringement of a patent." Id. at 435 (quoting statutory language
from 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1982)).
95. Id. at 435 (stating that "vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and
the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying
the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of
another"). The Sony Court cited to Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911), for its
utilization of third-party liability theories. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435. The Court in Kalem held the
producer of an unauthorized copy of the film Ben Hur liable for selling it to "jobbers," who in
turn displayed the work commercially. Kalem, 222 U.S. at 62-63. The Sony Court conflated the
theories of contributory and vicarious liability, recognizing that the contours of each theory had
not been clearly established. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 n.17. Therefore, when the Sony Court
referred to vicarious liability, "it did so broadly and outside of a technical analysis of the doctrine
of vicarious copyright infringement." Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023. In fact, the Sony Court referred
to the respondents' "unprecedented contributory infringement claim." Sony, 464 U.S. at 435
n.17. The Court did not explicitly analyze elements of contributory or vicarious liability as
currently understood, but focused on knowledge, the relationship between the parties, and the
VCR's capability for noninfringing use. Id. at 439, 441.
96. Sony, 464 U.S. at 438 ("The only contact between Sony and the users of the Betamax that
is disclosed by this record occurred at the moment of sale.").
97. Id. at 437-38.
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knowledge that customers possibly used the equipment for infringing
98
purposes was insufficient to affix liability in this case.
99
Next, the Court evaluated the staple article of commerce doctrine.
The Court explained that the doctrine served to establish a balance
between the public interest in the technology and the artist's interest in
protecting her copyright. 0 0 Thus, the doctrine permits the production
01
and sale of products with substantial noninfringing use capabilities.
The Court stated that if the staple article of commerce doctrine is found
to apply, then a producer of a product that is capable of infringing use
would be free from liability, notwithstanding the instrument's infringing
potential. 10 2 The Court noted that the doctrine applied only to
contributory theories of liability and would not shield a defendant from
10 3
vicarious liability.
The Supreme Court then applied the staple article of commerce
doctrine, determined that VCRs were not sold primarily for the purpose
of copying television programs, and thus held that they could qualify as
a staple article of commerce. 1°4 The Court found the Sony Betamax
capable of substantial noninfringing use because it could be used for
time-shifting or copying works that were not copyrighted or whose
05
copyright owners authorized the copying of their programs. 1
Part of the Court's evaluation under the staple article of commerce
doctrine revolved around application of the fair use defense. 10 6 The
Court weighed the fair use factors, determining that the activity had no

98. Id. at 439 ("There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious
liability on [a theory of constructive knowledge].").
99. Id. at 442.
100. Id. According to the Supreme Court in Sony:

The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a copyright
holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated
areas of commerce. Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment... does not
constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes.
Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.
Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (relying on
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][2] (2000)).
104. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
105. Id. at 442-46.

106. Id. at 433-34. Substantial noninfringing uses and the concept of fair use relate to each
other only to the extent that if a particular activity is deemed a fair use, it is noninfringing on the
copyright. See id. at 442 (stating that noninfringing uses necessarily include legitimate fair uses).
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effect on the commercial value of the works and that the use was private
in nature. 10 7 Thus, the Court concluded that time-shifting, or recording
broadcast television to be viewed later at a more convenient time, was a
fair use. 10 8 Moreover, the Court concluded that VCRs were capable of
substantial noninfringing uses; therefore, Sony was not responsible for
the infringing use in which some end users engaged. 1°9 The Sony
Court's application of the staple article of commerce doctrine to
copyright law constituted a significant development in the law and
0
remains the leading case for analyzing third-party copyright liability."l
11
2. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.

In Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit determined that Cherry Auction, the
host of a "swap meet," was liable for the sale of counterfeit music by its
vendors.1 1 2 Vendors at the meet paid a daily rental fee to Cherry
Auction, and Cherry Auction supplied utilities, parking, advertising,
plumbing, and customers. 1 13 Customers paid a fee upon entrance to the
premises. 114 Cherry Auction knew that many of the vendors sold
115
counterfeit music, infringing upon copyrights owned by Fonovisa.
107. See id. at 450 (noting that there was "no demonstrable effect upon the potential market
for, or the value of, the copyrighted work").
108. Id. at 442, 454-55. Time-shifting means that the VCR is used to record a program from
television to be watched later, at a more convenient time. Id. at 421. The district court found that
time-shifting was a legitimate fair use, even if the copyright holder did not authorize the conduct.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 466 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
109. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
110. E.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-22 (9th Cir. 2001)
(analyzing the Sony doctrine and finding Napster liable for copyright infringement arising from
its revolutionary file-trading software).
11. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). Although Fonovisa
did impact the music industry through the distribution of counterfeit music, the value of the
analysis in Fonovisa is not its response to a new technology but its definition of the type of
relationship required to impose vicarious liability. See id. at 264-65 (analyzing the application of
copyright law to counterfeit music).
112. Id. at 260-61. A "swap meet" is a forum where vendors may sell their wares, like a flea
market. Id. at 260.
113. Id. at 261.
114. Id.
115. Id. The court noted:
There is ... no dispute for purposes of this appeal that Cherry Auction and its
operators were aware that vendors in their swap meet were selling counterfeit
recordings in violation of Fonovisa's trademarks and copyrights. Indeed, it is alleged
that in 1991, the Fresno County Sheriffs Department raided the Cherry Auction swap
meet and seized more than 38,000 counterfeit recordings. The following year, after
finding that vendors at the Cherry Auction swap meet were still selling counterfeit
recordings, the Sheriff sent a letter notifying Cherry Auction of the on-going sales of
infringing material ....
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The case presented a difficult issue with regard to vicarious liability
because the relationship between the parties contained elements
consistent with both the "dance hall cases" and the "landlord-tenant
cases." 116 In the end, the court resolved the hybrid relationship in favor
of the plaintiffs, holding that Cherry Auction was more similar to a
dance hall owner, had demonstrated the requisite level of control to
impose vicarious liability because it could control admission and
advertising, and had contractually reserved the right to restrict market
access and vendor behavior. 1 17 Furthermore, the court found that the
financial benefit element of vicarious liability was satisfied because the
defendant received rental fees, admission fees, and revenues from
parking, food, and other customer services. 118 All of these financial
benefits can be attributed to the appeal the swap meet held in the eyes of
potential customers, an appeal likely bolstered by the simple presence of
119

the infringing activities.

In addition to vicarious liability, the court evaluated a claim of
contributory infringement and held Cherry Auction liable. 120 The court
stated that Cherry Auction clearly knew of the infringing activities,
thereby establishing the knowledge element. 12 1 The court also
determined that Cherry Auction's activities constituted a material
contribution. 122 The support services provided by Cherry Auction,
which the court characterized as site and facilities, adequately evinced a

116. See id. at 262-63; see also supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (outlining the
landlord-tenant and dance hall lines of cases and explaining the attributes of each). The district
court agreed with the defendant that Cherry Auction was like a landlord, charging rent to the
vendors. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262; Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492,
1496 (E.D. Cal. 1994). Nevertheless, the appellate court reversed, finding that the fees paid by
customers made the case more analogous to the dance hall line of decisions, subjecting the
defendant-appellee to liability. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263-64.
117. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262; see also Wright, supra note 63, at 1018-20 (analyzing the
divergent application of control in the district and appellate rulings).
118. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263.
119. Id. The financial benefits reaped from parking fees, admission fees, and food all
correlate directly with the number of customers present. Id. Likewise, the vendor rental fees
have a less direct correlation to total financial benefit; a vendor is more likely to rent space on the
premises based on the number of customers likely to be present, as this will translate into
revenues for the vendors. Id. Therefore, all of the financial benefits derived relate to the
infringing activities if it is found that the infringing activities act to bring in customers, as the
appellate court in fact found. Id. (comparing Fonovisa to the dance hall cases and stating that the
"infringing [behaviors] enhance the attractiveness of the venue to potential customers").
120. Id. at 264-65.
121. Id.; see also supra note 115 and accompanying text (demonstrating Cherry Auction's
sufficiency of knowledge).
122. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
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material contribution. 12 3 In making this determination, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the district court's reasoning that it would require some
type of express encouragement or some measure of protecting the
124
identity of the infringers, neither of which were present in the case.
Fonovisa stands for a broader application of third-party liability to
activities that do not actively contribute to the infringing behaviors, but
that nonetheless
provide a forum and support for those infringing
5
activities.

12

126

D. Copyright Law in Cyberspace

Lessons learned in the real world of swap meets and VCRs create the
backdrop for evaluation of similar issues in an online context. 12 7 The
exclusive rights granted by copyright law have remained essentially
unchanged over time, although technologies such as2 8 peer-to-peer
network topologies and the Internet have since appeared. 1
123. Id. (finding that Cherry Auction provided "space, utilities, parking, advertising,
plumbing, and customers" without which the infringing activity would not be able to proceed in
the "massive quantities alleged").
124. Id. at 265; Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1496 (E.D. Cal.
1994).
125. Wright, supra note 63, at 1020.
126. According to the Netcom court, "Cyberspace is a popular term for the world of electronic
communications over computer networks."
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1995). See generally I.
Trotter Hardy, The ProperLegal Regime for Cyberspace, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 994 (1994)
(discussing the legal implications of cyberspace).
127. See PATRICIA L. BELLIA ET AL., Problems of Metaphor and Analogy, in CYBERLAW:
PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE ch. 2 (2003); see also
Brett M. Frischmann, The Prospect of Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
205 (2003) (analyzing the different perspectives (internal and external) that one may use to
address various Internet-related issues and arguing that both perspectives add value to legal
analyses of the Internet); Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J.
357 (2003) (identifying and discussing the internal and external perspectives used to resolve
issues in an online context). Compare Frank H. Easterbook, Cyberspace and the Law of the
Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207 (arguing that existing law sufficiently elucidates various
principles that are applicable online), with Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999) (arguing that architectural aspects of
the Internet create new and different problems that cannot be resolved by looking to existing realworld legal principles).
128. KENNEDY ET AL., supra note 45, § 12:9 (elucidating the bundle of rights and discussing
its applicability in the face of developing Internet technologies).
Peer-to-peer network
technology, sometimes referred to as P2P, is "a system where each computer on a network serves
as both a workstation and a server," meaning that information can be shared between users
connected on the network.
Rob Hassett & Jeffrey D. Neuburger, Interactive Online
Entertainment, 695 PRAC. L. INST. 683, 690 (2002); see also Kevin P. Cronin & Ronald N.
Weikers, Security and Privacy in the Networked World, in DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY LAW:
COMBATTING CYBERTHREATS § 2:12 (Kevin P. Cronin & Ronald N. Weikers eds., 2003)
(analogizing a peer-to-peer network to a train-data passes between linked devices that
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Technological changes require courts to interpret copyright rules as
applied to a particular new technology. 12 9 Courts are generally
reluctant to expand existing laws; they prefer to defer to Congressional
guidance. 130 Courts must resolve any ambiguities in the law by
considering the underlying purpose of copyright law, specifically public
benefit, and not the incidental private economic gain achieved through a
grant of exclusive rights. 13'
The Internet provided the context for novel problems regarding thirdparty liability in copyright law. 132 Two cases evaluated content-based
third-party liability and reached opposite conclusions. 13 3 In Playboy
Enterprises,Inc. v. Frena, the District Court for the Middle District of
Florida held an online service provider ("OSP") liable for copyright
infringement as a direct infringer. 134 Service subscribers uploaded
information onto Frena's servers, which then became available for
download by other subscribers. 135 The court explained that direct

communicate as equals, as "people [move] between cars in a passenger train"). Peer-to-peer
networks are the most prevalent mechanism for Internet piracy, but not the only vehicle. See
Long, supra note 2, at 776-77 (enumerating other methods of piracy, including websites that
offer works for free or minimal fees, electronic mail, and bulletin boards).
129. KENNEDY ET AL., supra note 45, § 12:9 (claiming that the existing copyright bundle of
rights is sufficient when applied to new technologies, "albeit with occasional need for
interpretation and analysis"); see, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 421 (1984) (discussing the Supreme Court's application of copyright law to the thennovel VCR); see also supra Part II.C. I (discussing the Sony Court's analysis).
130. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430-31; e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 188, 222 (2003)
(upholding the Copyright Term Extension Act, which extends copyright protection from fifty
years to seventy years after the author's death, finding that it "reflects judgments of a kind
Congress typically makes"); Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414 (1974);
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1968); White-Smith
Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1908); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
131. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)); see also Dodes, supra note 19, at
282 (characterizing the Sony Court's decision as a balancing of "promoting widespread
distribution" against "providing incentives" to musicians and other artists to create new works).
132. See generally RONALD J. MANN & JANE K. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, at xxv
(2002) (introducing legal themes related to the Internet). The Internet impacts many other areas
of law besides copyright. Id. For an example of a case imposing liability for defamatory content,
see Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (denying plaintiff's request for relief
from an OSP for defamatory content posted by another party on its website). For property issues,
see generally eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-72 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(applying the trespass to chattels doctrine to websites).
133. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361; Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla.
1993).
134. Playboy Enters., 839 F. Supp. at 1556-57.
135. Id. at 1554.
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liability existed because the OSP made copies of the information
136
incidental to it being housed on its servers.
In contrast, the Northern District of California in Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services
reached the opposite conclusion regarding OSP liability on similar
facts. 137 Specifically, the court held that no direct infringement existed,
even though the OSP, Netcom, made copies of copyrighted works, and
therefore, Netcom was not liable for copyright infringement under a
third-party theory. 138 In this case, a Netcom subscriber and former
member of the Church of Scientology posted information copyrighted
by the church to his bulletin-board service, a forum dedicated to
criticism of the Church of Scientology. 139 Netcom's system made a
140
copy of the copyrighted works and stored the copy for eleven days.
The court analogized Netcom's role to that of an owner of a copying
machine that is available for public use. 141 Netcom merely made the
copies automatically, without any assertive act, and thus provided
mechanistically for the copies of the works rather than a concerted
42
intent to infringe the copyright. 1
On the contributory infringement theory, the court denied a motion
for summary judgment, citing the need for a factual determination of
whether Netcom knew of the infringement before it was too late for
action. 143 In outlining the knowledge requirement, the court determined
that the timing of the knowledge is critical; specifically, the defendant
must know of the infringement when the defendant is in a position to
attempt to prevent the infringement. 144 The Netcom court applied the
high-threshold test, which requires substantial participation in the direct
infringer's activities, and found no material contribution. 14 5 The

136.

137.
138.
liability
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 1559.

Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370-71.
Id. at 1369-70. The court analyzed direct, contributory, and vicarious theories of
and found each lacking. Id. at 1372, 1375-77.
Id. at 1365-66.
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1369.
Id.
Id. at 1374.

144. Id. at 1373-74 (comparing Netcom's activities with a line of landlord-tenant cases that
held that landlords were not liable for contributory copyright infringement because they had no
knowledge of the intended infringing uses at the time the leases were signed; subsequent
knowledge came at a time when the defendants were unable to do anything about the infringing
activities).
145. Id. at 1375.
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divergence in opinions set the stage for 1Congress
to take action and
46
decide the fate of online service providers.
E. Congress Acts-The DMCA
In response to changing technologies, Congress realized the need for
147
an update to copyright law, which came in the form of the DMCA.
The DMCA expanded existing copyright law through two fundamental
methods: 1) safe harbor provisions and 2) anti-circumvention
48
provisions. 1

1. Safe Harbors
The DMCA's safe harbor provisions protect service providers from
The DMCA sanctions
liability for their customers' conduct. 14 9
contributory and vicarious liability; Congress designed the safe harbor
provisions to insulate a would-be third-party infringer. 150 Prior to the
statutory provisions, courts differed in their determination of whether
third-party liability existed and how much liability should be assigned
to service providers. 151
There are four types of safe harbors within the DMCA, but two types
are at issue in file-trading cases: the "Trainsitory Digital Network
Communications Safe Harbor" 152 and the "Information Location Tools
Safe Harbor." 15 3 The former arises when a service provider provides
connections for infringing material through its network. 154 The latter
applies when the service provider refers or links users to infringing
146. See infra Part II.E (discussing Congressional enactment of the DMCA).
147. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
in relevant parts at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205).
148. Mousley, supra note 12, at 679 (discussing the provisions of the DMCA that affect the
entertainment industry).
149. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)-(c) (2000).
150. Wright, supra note 63, at 1033 (indicating Congress s intentions in implementing safe
harbors).
151. See supra Part II.D (discussing Internet service provider liability prior to the DMCA).
Cases diverged as to reasoning before the codification of the safe harbor provision. Compare,
e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1563 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding an OSP
liable when a subscriber uploaded infringing material), with Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom OnLine Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1381 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that an
OSP was merely a passive conduit for content and therefore not liable for infringing material
posted by a subscriber). For application of the safe harbor provision to an OSP, see Hendrickson
v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d. 1082, 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2001), in which the court found that eBay
complied with the requirements of the safe harbor provision of the DMCA and therefore was
excused from liability.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
153. Id. § 512(d).
154. Id. § 512(a).
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material or activities. 15 5 As a threshold matter, for either safe harbor

provision to apply, the actor must qualify as a service provider under
one of the broad definitions contained in the statute. 156 Also, the
service provider must embrace a policy to terminate access of repeat
1 57
infringers.
Essentially, the safe harbor provisions protect networks and force
copyright holders to pursue their claims against the individuals who
directly infringe upon their work. 158 If a service provider receives
notice of copyright infringement, the service provider may not be
shielded from liability; however, absent notice from a copyright holder,
a provider can claim protection under the DMCA provisions despite
15 9
having actual knowledge of the infringement.

2. Anti-Circumvention
The anti-circumvention provisions are independent of other copyright
law sections, meaning that an actor need not infringe on a copyright to
be liable for circumvention. 160 When a copyright holder puts in place a
technological measure designed to prevent infringements on its work,

155. Id. § 512(d).
156. Id. § 512(k). A service provider for purposes of the "Transitory Digital Network
Communication Safe Harbor" is "an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of
connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of
material... as sent or received." Id. § 512(k)(1)(A). For purposes of the "Information Location
Tools Safe Harbor," a service provider is "a provider of online services or network access, or the
operator of facilities therefor." Id. § 512(k)(1)(B).
157. Id. § 512(i)(1)(A) (noting that safe harbors only protect a service provider that "has
adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service
provider's system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network
who are repeat infringers").
158. Dodes, supra note 19, at 284 (arguing that safe harbor provisions force copyright holders
to sue individuals).
159. Id. (characterizing the notice requirement as a loophole unsuccessfully utilized by
Napster); see also Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that defendant
Aimster could not rely on a voluntary act of encryption to excuse lack of knowledge of copyright
infringement).
160. Kirk R. Ruthenberg, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, in DATA SECURITY AND
PRIVACY LAW: COMBATING CYBERTHREATS, supra note 128, § 6.88. In addition to prohibiting
actual tampering, the anti-circumvention provisions prohibit "'trafficking' in any technology,
product, service, device, component or part that is primarily designed or produced for the purpose
of circumventing a [protected] technological protection measure." Long, supra note 2, at 790
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)-(c) (2000)). There are exceptions, however, which allow limited
circumvention rights to educational institutions and law enforcement for reverse engineering,
encryption research, security testing, and privacy protection. Id. Notably missing is any general
fair use exception. Id.
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16 1
no one may tamper with or attempt to circumvent that safeguard.
Congress enacted these provisions to encourage copyright holders to
utilize available technologies and to make their works available on the
Internet. 162
Nonetheless, some skepticism surrounds the anti163
provisions.
circumvention
In order for a technological measure to qualify for coverage under the
DMCA anti-circumvention laws, the measure must be effective. 164 For
example, the record industry sought to protect the intellectual property
contained on compact discs by a technological measure that prevented a
165
compact disc's owner from copying the music into an MP3 format.
Unfortunately for musicians, the public quickly learned that the
measure
166
was easily circumvented by the use of a black felt-tip marker.

F. Applying the DMCA to Internet Piracy:Diamond Multimedia

and Napster
Courts have reached variant conclusions when applying the DMCA
to new online technologies. 167 In 1999, the Ninth Circuit, in Recording
Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.

evaluated a novel piece of technology manufactured by Diamond
Multimedia called the Rio. 168 The Rio is a device capable of
downloading MP3 files from a computer hard drive, which makes the
songs more mobile. 169 Relying on Sony, the Ninth Circuit determined
that space-shifting, or the movement of music already owned from one
161. Ruthenberg, supra note 160, § 6.88. Circumvention is a "technological measure that
effectively controls access to [a] work," described by Congress as "the electronic equivalent of
breaking into a locked room in order to obtain a copy of a book." H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(I), at
17 (1998).
162. Ruthenberg, supra note 160, § 6.88 (citing 144 CONG. REC. S12730-01 (daily ed. Oct.
20, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy)).
163.

See Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to Advance and Enhance

Online Music Distribution,8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 477 (2002) (stating that critics of anticircumvention legislation argue that this provision unduly expands copyright law).
164. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) (stating that no person may circumvent "a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected" by the statute); Long, supra note 2,
at 789 (stating that effectiveness is determined by whether the measure works absent attempts to
circumvent).
165. Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at C10.
166. Id. (stating that CDs thought to be protected against copying were easily converted to
MP3 files after their owners drew lines on the discs with felt-tip markers).
167. Compare Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding a manufacturer of new technology not liable for copyright
infringement), with A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001)
(affixing liability to a purveyor of novel online technology).
168.

Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1072.

169. Id.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

medium to another, is a fair use. 170 As in Sony, the court emphasized
that the activity involved was private in nature. 17 1 Because use of the
device was a fair use, the court held that the Rio did not subject its
172
manufacturers to liability.
Meanwhile, Napster developed its "MusicShare" software, which
enabled the transfer of MP3 files. 173 MusicShare employs a peer-topeer network, which is a decentralized network architecture that does
not utilize a server. 17 4 Napster also maintained a centralized database of
available songs that its users could peruse. 17 5 To determine whether
Napster was liable for its users' music piracy, the Ninth Circuit, in
A &M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., evaluated Napster under third-party
theories of liability. 176 At issue in Napster and other cases brought
against file-swapping software distributors were the exclusive rights of
177
reproduction and distribution.
In holding Napster liable for copyright infringement, the court
rejected the fair use defense that the software could be used for
sampling, space-shifting, and permissive uses. 178 The court found two
170. Id. at 1079 (noting that the portable MP3 player, called Rio, "merely makes copies in
order to render portable, or 'space-shift,' those files that already reside on a user's hard drive" and
that "[s]uch copying is a paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the
purposes of the Act"). See generally supra Part II.C. 1 (discussing the Sony case).
171. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079. See generally supra Part II.C. 1 (discussing the
Sony case).
172. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079.
173. Fagin et al., supra note 163, at 459.
174. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001). For further
discussion of peer-to-peer technology, see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
175. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012 (describing Napster's music library); Fagin et al., supra note
163, at 459 (stating that although the transfers of the files were peer-to-peer, the Napster scheme
relied on the centralized searching capabilities).
176. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019-24; ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON
ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING & THE ARTS § 1:15 (2d ed. 2003) (stating that "[b]ecause Napster
itself does not actually store the music files on its system, its liability would be for contributory
infringement or vicarious liability").
177. See NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW, supra note 51, § 4:27. The right of reproduction is set
forth in 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), and the right of distribution is embodied in § 106(3).
178. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1017. Sampling refers to the practice of downloading the file to
determine whether to buy the recording. Id. at 1018. The court found sampling to be commercial
and deleterious to the music industry. Id. If a user downloads music in an MP3 format that she
already owns on a CD or in another format, then she has engaged in space-shifting. Id. at 1019.
The court determined that the shifting analyses of Sony and Diamond Multimedia were
inapplicable because "the methods of shifting in these cases did not also simultaneously involve
distribution of the copyrighted material to the general public; the time or space-shifting of
copyrighted material exposed the material only to the original user." Id. Permissive reproduction
means that either the artists themselves engage in distributing their own works, a right reserved to
them by virtue of the copyright, or that the copyright owner has authorized others to distribute her
works. Id.
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of the district court findings persuasive: first, that distribution to
anonymous requesters cannot qualify as a private use, and second, that

users receive for free something they would ordinarily be required to
buy. 179 Furthermore, unlike in Sony, the users' activities adversely
impacted the products' commercial value. 180 The court distinguished
the Napster users' actions with those at issue in Diamond Multimedia
because Napster users' activities involved simultaneous distribution 18of1

the music rather than a private fair use of the copyrighted works.

Moreover, the Napster court determined that the shifting analyses of
82
Sony and Diamond Multimedia were inapplicable. 1
The court then held that Napster was liable under both contributory
and vicarious theories of liability. 183 Looking first to the knowledge
requirement of contributory liability, the Napster court interpreted the
Sony decision to mean that a party satisfied the knowledge requirement
only by actual knowledge. 184 The court noted that this is especially true
in the online context, where the ability of service providers to monitor
behaviors and individual uses is particularly limited. 185 Despite the
higher standard, the court determined that Napster had sufficient
86
knowledge to make contributory liability appropriate. 1
Next, the Napster court analyzed contributory liability's second
element of material contribution, utilizing a "but for"-style analysis: the
court determined that absent the support services provided by Napster,
the infringement would be more difficult. 187 Services offered by
179. Id. at 1015.
180. Id. at 1016 (finding that Napster's service reduced CD sales among college students and
created obstacles to plaintiffs' ability to enter the market for digital downloading); see supra Part
II.C.l (discussing the Sony case). The appellate court seemed to reason in the alternative that
even if online sampling is beneficial to CD sales, that would still be insufficient to "deprive the
copyright holder of the right to license the material." Napster,239 F.3d at 1018 (citing Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 n.21 (1994)).
181. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019; see supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text (discussing
Diamond Multimedia).
182. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019; see supra Part II.C.I (discussing the Sony case); supra 168172 and accompanying text (discussing DiamondMultimedia).
183. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020, 1024.
184. Id. at 1020-22 (noting the Sony Court's refusal to apply liability based on constructive
knowledge); see supra Part H.C. 1 (discussing Sony); see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom OnLine Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (implying that actual
knowledge is required in an online context).
185. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 ("[A]bsent any specific information which identifies
infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement
merely because the structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.").
186. Id. at 1021, 1022 & n.6 (determining that the defendants had actual notice because they
were informed of the infringement by the RIAA).
187. Id. at 1022.
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Napster included software, search engines, and servers, which were
essentially the means to establish peer connections, and without which
188

users would be unable to find and download the music they desired.

Finally, the court examined the two elements of vicarious liability; it

decided that Napster received a financial benefit from infringement by
its customers, the first element of vicarious liability. 189 Relying on
Fonovisa, the court found that the infringing activity attracted
customers to Napster, and that Napster's future revenue depended on
the increased customer base. 190 Likewise, the court found that Napster
had the right and ability to supervise the conduct of its users, the second
requirement for vicarious liability. 19 1 Like in Fonovisa, Napster
expressly reserved the right to block access to its website at its
discretion. 192 Thus, the Napster court determined that this early-

generation file-sharing
software
19 3

subjected Napster to copyright

infringement liability.

G. The Digital World Post Napster

Internet purveyors of file-swapping software continue to market their
wares; indeed, most have not relented in the wake of the Napster
decision. 194 Digital piracy is still prevalent. 195 Many services have
attempted to modify their specific technology and particular behaviors
to avoid liability. 196 Some utilize the popular FastTrack software,
which, unlike Napster, uses the "super-node" rather than a centralized

188. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 920 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
189. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
190. Id.; see supra Part II.C.2 (discussing Fonovisa).

191. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023-24.
192.

See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing Fonovisa).

193. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027.
194. See After Napster-The Free Alternatives, at http://www.aftemapster.com (last visited
Oct. 18, 2003) (listing fifty-three services replacing Napster). The term "Napster Knockoffs"
refers to the many systems that have emerged contemporaneously to or since Napster. Hassett &
Neuburger, supra note 128, at 690 (referring to Gnutella- and Morpheus-based systems).
195. See After Napster-The Free Alternatives, supra note 194; supra note 19 and
accompanying text (discussing the current prevalence of Internet music piracy). Several websites
represent themselves as "Napster replacements" or "Napster alternatives." See, e.g., MP3 Grand
Central, at http://www.mp3grandcentral.net (last visited Oct. 18, 2003) (describing itself as a
"Napster replacement," and charging the nominal fee of ninety-nine cents per month); Ideal
World Direct, Napster Lives On!, at http://www.ishareit.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2003) (same);
see also MP3DownloanHQ.com, at http://www.mp3downloadhq.com (last visited Oct. 3, 2003)
(describing itself as a "Napster alternative," charging the nominal fee of $1.00 per month);
DownLoad-Doctor.com, at http://www.download-doctor.com (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (same).
196. E.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1040 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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database of available files. 197

Others utilize another type of peer-to-

peer technology called the "virtual private network," which piggy-backs
on instant messaging services. 19 8 These modified technologies and new
business models indicate that additional online copyright infringement
litigation may occur.

199

Another attribute of modem file-trading software is encryption
technology, which is used to secure the identities of its users, making it
difficult to monitor or determine the identity of the offenders. 20 0 In
response to these and other technologies, record companies and artists
who are frustrated by the prolific piracy and resultant losses in revenue
have resorted
to self-help tactics. 20 1 Self-help remedies include
"spoofing" 20 2 and "interdiction." ' 20 3 These measures raise the stakes in
the battle over music. 20 4 Furthermore, the Internet is global, as is the
problem of Internet piracy, making the issues all the more difficult to
solve.

2 05

197. Fagin et al., supra note 163, at 461 (explaining the utilization of "super-nodes" as an
alternative to centralized search capabilities). Super-nodes are other users' computers, and the
systems are self-organizing. Id. The FastTrack providers included StreamCast Networks, Kazaa,
and Grokster. Id.
198. Id. at 462. For more information about the peer-to-peer network generally, see supra
note 128 and accompanying text.
199. See infra Parts IH.A-B (discussing litigation against Aimster and Grokster, respectively).
200. See, e.g., Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 641 (N.D. I11.2002), aff'd, 334 F.3d 643 (7th
Cir. 2003).
201. Long, supra note 2, at 791-92.
202. See Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at CIO ("Spoofing involves the creation of decoy files to
hinder file swappers searching for a particular song."). These decoy files may be infected with
computer viruses. Long, supra note 2, at 792. One recent example of spoofing involved
Eminem's label, which "allegedly flooded the file-swapping networks with bogus copies of songs
from his recently released album." Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at CIO; see also MGM Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (referring to angry Grokster
customers who downloaded files containing a computer virus).
203. See Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at C10 ("Interdiction creates an online traffic jam that
blocks others on the network from accessing a work offered for copying.").
204. See id. (discussing potential technological self-help measures).
205. See Fagin et al., supra note 163, at 470-71 (arguing that international solutions to the
global problem are emerging slowly but are currently still in their infancy, making the proper
focus for solutions domestic). The World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade
Organization offer hope for "multinational harmonization," the traditional approach to
international intellectual property law, as opposed to "international governance." Id. at 470; see
also John

Borland,

Spanish Site

Offers Music-File Fiesta, CNET

NEWS.COM,

at

http://news.com.com/2100-1027-1007920.html (May 19, 2003) (discussing a new Spanish Web
service offering music online, thereby demonstrating the issues that result from the international
character of the Internet); John Lui, Antipiracy Team Scans Asia P2P Sites, CNET NEWS.COM, at

http://news.com.comI2100-1027_3-1013483.html (June 5, 2003) (discussing the Business
Software Alliance and Internet service providers working to shut down websites that traffic
pirated software).
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III. DISCUSSION
Two recent cases addressed new technological models of file-trading
software, diverging not only in their conclusion of liability but also in
their applications of law. 2°6 In In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, the
Seventh Circuit found Aimster contributorily liable for copyright
infringement. 20 7 Conversely, in MGM Studios v. Grokster, the Central
District of California held Grokster not liable under any third-party
theory of liability and concluded that the software was protected under
the staple article of commerce doctrine. 20 8 This Part traces in depth the
rationale employed by the district court and Seventh Circuit opinions in
Aimster.20 9 Next, this Part delves into the analysis utilized in the
by isolating the points of
Grokster decision. 2 10 This Part 2concludes
11
contention between the two cases.
A. In re Aimster Copyright Litigation

2 12

In June 2003, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Northern District of
Illinois' order which granted a preliminary injunction against Aimster in
a multi-district consolidation of eleven cases. 2 13 Aimster distributed a
file-sharing technology that customers used to trade files, often in
violation of copyright law. 2 14 The Northern District of Illinois affixed
liability to Aimster based on contributory and vicarious liability

206. Borland, supra note 7.
207. Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643, 653-54 (7th Cir. 2003).
208. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The
recording industry plaintiffs motioned for an expedited appeal, a motion subsequently granted by
the Ninth Circuit on July 16, 2003. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Nos. 03-55894, 0355901 (9th Cir. 2003). Party and amici briefs as well as motions and other court documents in
this case are available on the Electronic Frontier Foundation's website: http://www.eff.org/
IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/.
209. See infra Part II1.A (examining the Aimster decision).
210. See infra Part II1.B (studying the Grokster case).
211. See infra Part III.C (pinpointing the areas of divergence between the Aimster and
Grokster courts).
212. Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), aff'g 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002). The
name "Aimster" was a derivation of AOL's instant messaging service, "AIM." JOHN W.
HAZARD, JR., Contributory Infringement Via New Technology, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN BUSINESS
AND PRACTICE § 7:40 (2003). Aimster's name change to Madster resulted from litigation with
America Online over the name. See Madster, at http://www.madster.com (last visited Oct. 17,
2003).
213. AimsterI, 334 F.3d at 645,655-56.
214. Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 648 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see also infra Part III.A.1 (iterating
the facts presented in the Aimster case).
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theories. 2 15 The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the contributory
theory but
2 16
declined to determine the issue of vicarious liability.
1. Facts
Aimster is a file-sharing service that utilizes America Online's instant
messaging system, AIM.2 1 7 The defendants in the action included the
John A. Deep, the creator of Aimster, and two additional companies of
his founding, collectively referred to as "Aimster." 2 18 The plaintiffs
included record companies as well as songwriters and music publishers,
2 19
who collectively owned copyrights on most popular American music.

Aimster's software facilitated the creation of peer-to-peer networks
through which users could transfer files. 220 Significantly, Aimster's
software assured its users privacy through the use of encryption
technology. 22 1 This technology prevented anyone other than the users
themselves, including Aimster,
from monitoring or discovering the
22 2
contents of a file transfer.
Aimster's original software, called Classic Aimster, enabled users to
transfer MP3 music files, or any other type of file, at the will of the
individual user. 22 3 A user would download the software free of
charge. 2 24 The Aimster software allowed a user to designate other users
as buddies, but in lieu of customer designation, the software identified
all other Aimster users logged on to AIM as members of the buddy list,

215. Ajinster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 651-53, 659; see also infra Part III.A.2 (outlining the
rationale employed by the Northern District of Illinois).
216. Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 654-56; see also infra Part III.A.3 (describing the reasoning
utilized by the Seventh Circuit).
217. Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 646-47.
218. Id. at 645. The two other companies Deep founded were BuddyUSA, Inc., devoted to
software development, and AbovePeer, Inc., charged with operating the systems. Aimster 1, 252
F. Supp. 2d at 638-39.
219. Aimsterll, 334 F.3d at 645.
220. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 641. The Seventh circuit characterized the functionality as
"similar to that of a stock exchange, which is a facility for matching offers rather than a
repository of the things being exchanged (shares of stock)." Id. at 647. "But unlike transactions
on a stock exchange, the consummated 'transaction' in music files does not take place in the
facility, that is, in Aimster's server." Id. For more information on the peer-to-peer network
technology, see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
221. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 641; see also Aimster H, 334 F.3d at 646, 650 (noting that
"'[e]ncryption' comes from the Greek word for concealment").
222. Aimster I!,334 F. 3d at 650.
223. Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 642; see also Aimster H, 334 F.3d at 647 (describing the
potential for file-sharing systems to be used for "innocuous purposes" such as transferring
"confidential business data").
224. Aimster !1,
334 F.3d at 646.
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increasing the file-searching capabilities between peer users. 225 The file
transfer itself was easy and initiated solely by the user.2 26 The Aimster
system accomplished the transfer through a private, encrypted peer
network.2 2 7 Also, the system provided status information as the
copying progressed and the ability to automatically resume an
2 28
interrupted transfer.
The more recent version of the Aimster service, Club Aimster, was a
re-bundled version of Classic Aimster that charged a monthly fee. 22 9 In
addition to the Classic Aimster functionality, Club Aimster utilized a
website that included a list of the top-forty selections, commentary, and
a one-click download option for its users, leaving no need to manually
search the network for a peer with the desired song. 230 The website also
provided a system tutorial, which showed copyrighted material being
swapped. 23 1 The Club Aimster version became the only version of the
system available, and any attempts to download the free Classic Aimster
232
software resulted in a connection and request to join Club Aimster.
2. The Northern District of Illinois Decision
The Northern District of Illinois determined that Aimster's
technology subjected defendants to third-party liability. 233 The court
reasoned that Aimster met the requirements of contributory liability and
no applicable defenses applied. 234 The court refused to apply the staple
article of commerce doctrine because it found the doctrine
inapplicable. 235 Furthermore, the court found sufficient basis to
establish vicarious liability. 23 6
Finally, the court rejected the
2 37
applicability of the DMCA's safe harbor provisions.

225. Id.
226. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 642-43.
227. Id. at 643.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 644. The monthly fee was $4.95. Id.
230. Id. at 644-45.
231. Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003).
232. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
233. Id. at 653, 659.
234. Id. at 649, 653; see also infra Part III.A.2.a (outlining the district court's analysis of the
contributory liability claim and applicable defenses).
235. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 653; see also infra Part III.A.2.b (discussing the staple
article of commerce doctrine as applied to Aimster by the Northern District of Illinois).
236. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 659; see also infra Part III.A.2.c (examining the court's
analysis of vicarious liability).
237. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 659; see also infra Part III.A.2.d (exploring the district
court's rationale in refusing to apply of the DMCA safe harbor provisions).
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a. Contributory Liability
The district court in Aimster began with an evaluation of contributory
liability and the fair use defense raised by Aimster. 2 38 The court
determined, like the Napster court, that the case did not represent
permissible space-shifting. 239
Aimster was distinguishable from
Diamond Multimedia because that case
did not involve further
240
distribution of the copyrighted materials.
In its threshold determination of contributory liability, the court
found direct infringement existed on the part of the Aimster users, a fact
not contested by Aimster. 24 1 Next, the court evaluated whether Aimster
knew, or had reason to know, of the infringing activities, as required for
the knowledge element of contributory liability. 242
The court
243
determined that various letters by the plaintiffs put Aimster on notice.
Also, the court placed significance on the Club Aimster website because
the defendants identified and commented on particular copyrighted
2 44
materials on the website.
Moreover, the court rejected the defendants' argument that they could
not know the identity of users or contents of particular transfers because

238. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 649.
239. Id.; see also supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text (discussing fair use in the
Napster case). See generally supra note 170 and accompanying text (defining space-shifting).
240. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 649. In Diamond Multimedia, the issue revolved around
the use of files already in the users' possession, and the court had no reason to evaluate the
acquisition of those files. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180
F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 1999). For further discussion of fair use arguments in Diamond
Multimedia and Napster, see supra Part II.F. For more information about the Rio specifically,
see supra note 168-169 and accompanying text (noting that Rio is a portable MP3 player).
241. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 648. See generally supra Part II.B.1 (outlining the elements
of contributory liability); supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
direct liability to claims of third-party theories of copyright infringement).
242. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 650; see also supra Part II.B.1 (outlining the elements of
contributory liability).
243. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 650; see also supra Part H.B.1 (outlining the elements of
contributory liability). Three letters were sent, as the district court detailed:
On April 3, 2000, Frank Creighton of the RIAA sent a cease-and-desist letter to
Defendants in which he detailed the availability of copyrighted works on Aimster.
Again, on May 9, 2001, Mr. Creighton sent a cease-and-desist letter to Defendants, this
time including screen shots showing approximately 2900 sound recordings owned or
controlled by RAA members available for download through Aimster. On November
26, 2001, Mr. Creighton sent a third letter to Defendants again demonstrating the
existence of unauthorized sound recordings available through Aimster and specifically
mentioning Club Aimster.
Id. (citations omitted).
244. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 650; see supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the attributes of
Aimster's file-trading system).
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the software utilized encryption technology. 24 5 While the evidence
demonstrated that the encryption technology prevented the defendants
from possessing information regarding any specific transfers, the court
dismissed Aimster's argument because Aimster created and provided
the encryption technology; thus, Aimster hindered its own
knowledge. 246 Also, the court stated that no authority existed that
required such specificity in knowledge to assign contributory
liability.2 4 7 The court further reasoned that encryption technology did
not prevent constructive knowledge, which the court found sufficient to
24 8
establish contributory liability.
Next, the court turned to the second element of contributory liability,
material contribution. 249 The court, relying on Napster and Fonovisa,
held that Aimster materially contributed to the direct infringement of
copyrighted works. 2 50 The court found that Aimster provided software
25 1
and services that enabled the Aimster users to connect to each other.
The court stressed that the Aimster service was different from an
ordinary service provider because the Club Aimster website ranked
songs and enticed would-be infringers. 25 2 Moreover, the court stressed
how easy Aimster made the process of downloading music files for its
customers. 25 3 Thus, having established the requisite elements, the court
found Aimster contributorily liable for copyright infringement, unless
2 54
the defendants could find justification in a defense.
b. Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine
Aimster argued that its software was capable of substantial
noninfringing use, within the meaning of Sony, because it could be used
245. Aimster1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 650-51.
246. Id. at 651.
247. Id.
248. Id.; see also supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (outlining the requirements of
contributory liability and the knowledge element).
249. Aimsterl, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 651-52.
250. Id.; see also supra Part II.C.2 (discussing broad application of the material contribution
element in Fonovisa); supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text (discussing the court's finding
that Napster materially contributed to acts of infringement).
251. Aimsterl, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 652.
252. Id.; see also supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text (discussing the attributes of
Club Aimster).
253. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 652. The court, quoting in part from the plaintiff's brief,
determined that "'Aimster predicat[ed] its entire service upon furnishing a 'road map' for users to
find, copy, and distribute copyrighted music."' Id. at 652 (quoting plaintiffs' brief). The court
stated that the "Defendants manage[d] to do everything but actually steal the music off the store
shelf and hand it to Aimster's users." Id.
254. Id. at 651-53.
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to transfer any file, including non-copyrighted works and business
records. 255 Aimster also contended that its service could be used to find
persons of similar interests to form social ties and clubs. 256 The court
rejected these arguments because the record showed a dearth of
evidence, beyond mere assertion, that Aimster users employed any of
25 7
these uses.
Furthermore, the court rejected the notion that Aimster could
represent a staple article of commerce. 2 58 The court distinguished the
Aimster service from Sony on the basis that Aimster was not a discrete
product but, instead, a bundled service. 2 59 Also, the relationship
between Aimster and the direct infringer was continuous, therefore
distinguishing it from Sony, where the relationship ended at the moment
the sale occurred. 2 60 Furthermore, the court distinguished Sony by the
character of the use employed.2 6 ' In Sony, the use was private and inhome and never extended to distribution. 262 In contrast, Aimster users'
activities were not private because each user became a "global
263
distributor" of the music, which any other Aimster user could copy.
Finally, the court concluded that the software was designed and
marketed specifically for its infringing uses. 2 64 Therefore, the staple
article of commerce doctrine failed to shield Aimster from contributory
liability. 26 5
c.

Vicarious Liability
Next, the court determined whether Aimster was vicariously liable
for the copyright infringements, based on Aimster's ability to control its
users and Aimster's receipt of a financial benefit from the infringing
activities. 266 The court held that Aimster did control its users; it noted
255. Id. at 652-53; see supra Part II.C.! (discussing Sony and the staple article of commerce
doctrine).
256. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 653.
257. Id.
258. Id. See generally supra Part n.C.I (discussing Sony and the staple article of commerce
doctrine).
259. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 653 (finding that Aimster more closely resembled the swap
meet of Fonovisa than the VCRs of Sony). See generally supra Part I.C. I (discussing the Sony
decision).
260. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 653; see also supra Part B.C. I (discussing Sony).
261. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 653-54. See generally supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the
Sony decision).
262. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 653-54; see also supra Part B.C. 1 (discussing Sony).
263. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 654.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 654-55.
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that Aimster contractually retained the right to terminate individual
users and stressed in its policy that it would take down infringing works
and that repeat infringement would result in termination. 2 67 Also, the
court relied on the existence of Club Aimster, reasoning that the
requirement of a user name and password login necessarily meant that
Aimster maintained a supervisory role over its users. 268 Because
copyright law does not require precise knowledge, the court rejected the
defendants' claim that they could not supervise user behavior due to the
encryption software. 269 However, the login process and monthly
270
payment scheme refuted this contention.
The Aimster court also found a financial benefit because Club
Aimster required payment of a monthly fee. 27 1
Additionally,
defendants solicited money on their website to support their legal fight
for free music downloads, ironically providing an additional financial
tie. 272 The court noted that even beyond these examples of direct
financial benefit, the Aimster system satisfied the financial benefit
prong for vicarious liability if the infringing activities enticed potential
customers, as demonstrated here. 2 73 In summary, the court established
Aimster's ability to control its users and that Aimster received financial
benefit from the infringing activities, and thus assessed vicarious
274
liability.
d. Safe Harbor Provisions
In its analysis of the safe harbor provisions, the court found as a
threshold matter that Aimster was a service provider under both
definitions of the DMCA. 275 However, the court determined that
Aimster was ineligible for either the Transitory Communications Safe
Harbor or the Information Location Tools Safe Harbor because Aimster

267. Id.
268. Id. at 655. See generally supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text (discussing
attributes of Aimster's website and Club Aimster).
269. Aimster 1 252 F. Supp. 2d at 655.
270. Id. See generally infra Part IIl.A.1 (outlining the attributes of Aimster's file-trading
business).
271. Aimsterl, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 655.
272. Id.; see infra Part HI.A. 1 (outlining the attributes of Aimster's file-trading business).
273. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 655 (citing with approval Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction,
Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263--64 (9th Cir. 1996), and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001)).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 658 (commenting that the court has "trouble imagining the existence of an online
service that would not fall under the definitions"). For the required definitions, see supra note
156.
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had not adopted and implemented a policy to bar repeat copyright
infringers. 276 Despite the formal indications that Aimster had such a
policy, 277 the court noted that the problem was Aimster's
implementation of the policy. 27 8 The defendants claimed that they
could not adequately implement the policy due to their encryption
technology but stated that they would respond if given notice of specific
cases of infringement. 2 79 The court rejected the defendants' contention
that they would respond to notice, finding that the DMCA safe harbor
did not place the burden on the copyright holder to discover
Furthermore, the encryption
infringement or provide notice. 280
argument failed, as it had for the knowledge element, because, as the
court noted, a provider may not willfully create a scheme, hiding from
sought, and then claim the benefit of its
itself the information
28 1
ignorance.
Even though the court found that Aimster did not qualify for
protection under the safe harbor provisions because it lacked a
reasonably implemented policy against infringement, the court
considered each of the safe harbors in turn. 282 The court held that the
Transitory Communications Safe Harbor did not shield Aimster because
it applied to materials or information traveling through a defendant's
system. 283 Because Aimster established a peer-to-peer connection
2 84
between its users, the files did not travel through Aimster's systems.
276. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 658.
277. Id. (referring to the copyright infringement notice found on defendant's website).
278. Id. at 659.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. (determining that adopting a policy, then voluntarily preventing it from ever being
actionable is not the implementation required under 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)).
282. Id. at 659-61 (addressing relevant safe harbor arguments for the sake of completeness,
although Aimster failed to qualify for the provisions).
283. Id. The parties disagreed as to the meaning of the word "through"; the plaintiffs' urged a
narrow construction, implying that the defendants' systems must act "as a conduit" for the
materials. Id. at 660. The defendants suggested that "through" should be interpreted more
broadly, as "by means of." Id. However, the court looked to the legislative history, finding that
the plaintiffs' theory was more in line with Congress' intentions. Id. The court found that the
"Transitory Communications Safe Harbor is limited to situations 'in which a service provider
plays the role of a conduit for the communications of others."' Id. (relying on H.R. REP. No.
105-551(11) (1998)); see also supra Part II.E. I (discussing safe harbor provisions).
284. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 660. The court found that Aimster provided services
beyond mere infrastructure, which disqualified it for protection. Id. (citing Aimster's "broad
search capabilities.... automatic resumption of interrupted downloads .... easy one-click
downloading .... and editorial comments" as evidence that Aimster is more than a mere conduit).
The court also briefly turned to the System Caching safe harbor, summarily determining that
defendants did not qualify. Id. at 660-61. According to the court in Aimster, the defendants
misconstrued this safe harbor to mean that if they did copy materials onto their servers, they
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285
The court also looked to the Information Location Tools Safe Harbor.
This safe harbor did not protect Aimster because a party who has
knowledge of the infringing activities or receives a financial benefit
from the activity fails to qualify.286 Thus, Aimster could not find
protection under any of the safe harbor provisions. 287 In sum, the court
granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunction, noting a strong
288
likelihood of success on the merits.

3. The Seventh Circuit Decision
The appellate court largely accepted the rationale of the district court
and focused its opinion on addressing specific arguments brought by the
parties on appeal. 289 Like the district court, the Seventh Circuit
290
determined that Aimster subjected itself to contributory liability.
Furthermore, instead of declining to apply the staple article of
commerce doctrine, the appellate court determined that the evidence
291
proffered was insufficient to establish substantial noninfringing uses.
The Seventh Circuit did not reach the issue of vicarious liability, finding
292
it unnecessary to affirm the lower court's decision of liability.

would be immune from liability. Id. at 660. Instead, they would be sheltered only if the cause of
action cited their caching as an infringement of the copyright. Id. at 661.
285. Id. at 661. See generallysupra Part II.E. I (discussing safe harbor provisions).
286. Ainster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 661. A service provider is deemed to meet the knowledge
requirement if it has knowledge of actual infringing activities or constructive knowledge from
facts making the existence of infringement apparent. Id. This element is satisfied by the same
rationale as the knowledge requisite for contributory liability. Id.; see also supra notes 66-67 and
accompanying text (discussing the knowledge element generally). On the financial benefit
provision, as under the vicarious liability element, the court found that a financial benefit existed
and the defendants had the ability to control the activities. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 661; see
also supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing the financial benefit element).
Finally, the safe harbor provisions required defendants to remove infringing material promptly
upon notice. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 661. The court found that, based on a technicality, this
notice requirement was not met because the plaintiffs gave notice to the owner personally rather
than to the designated agent; however, the court held that this point was moot since the
defendants failed to qualify under the first two threshold conditions. Id.
287. Id. at 656-61.
288. Id. at 665.
289. AimsterH, 334 F.3d 643, 648-56(7th Cir. 2003).
290. Id. at 654; see also infra Part III.A.3.a (tracing the Seventh Circuit's rationale of
contributory liability).
291. Aimster H, 334 F.3d at 653; see also infra Part III.A.3.b (discussing application of the
staple article of commerce doctrine by the Seventh Circuit).
292. Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 654; see also infra Part IlI.A.3.c (examining the vicarious liability
claim as reasoned by Seventh Circuit).
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Finally, the court noted293that the safe harbor provisions could not protect
Aimster from liability.
a. Contributory Liability
The Seventh Circuit first noted that the policy behind contributory
liability is to provide meaningful copyright protection to copyright
holders, allowing them to pursue their claims with third parties who
help direct infringement to occur.2 94 The court characterized the users
of Aimster software as teenagers and young adults uninterested in or
contemptuous of copyright law and thus found that pursuing individual
infringers would not provide meaningful copyright protection. 29 5 The
court stated that even though infringing transactions did not occur on
Aimster's systems, Aimster still took part in the transactions by
facilitating the transfers between individuals, making contributory
296
liability appropriate.
Like the district court, the Seventh Circuit rejected Aimster's
argument that its encryption technology prevented it from acquiring the
requisite knowledge, thereby shielding it from liability. 297 The court
characterized the encryption technology as "willful blindness," which
was sufficient to establish the knowledge requirement. 298 The court
highlighted the social benefits of encryption technology generally and
reasoned that employing such software did not automatically make one

293. Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 655; see also infra Part III.A.3.d (outlining the safe harbor
rationale utilized by Seventh Circuit).
294. Ainster H, 334 F.3d at 645. As the court reasoned, "Recognizing the impracticability or
futility of a copyright owner's suing a multitude of individual infringers... the law allows a
copyright holder to sue a contributor to the infringement instead, in effect as an aider and
abettor." Id. at 645. In addition to comparing contributory liability to aiding and abetting, the
court also drew an analogy to intentional interference with contract, stating that more effective
enforcement requires holding these third parties liable. Id. See generally supra Part II.B.1
(discussing contributory liability generally).
295. Aimster H, 334 F.3d at 645 ("The swappers, who are ignorant or more commonly
disdainful of copyright and in any event discount the likelihood of being sued or prosecuted for
copyright infringement, are the direct infringers."). The court referred to suing individual users as
"impracticabl[e] and futil[e]." Id.
296. Id. at 646-47. The court compared Aimster's functionality to "a stock exchange, which
is a facility for matching offers rather than a repository of the things being exchanged." Id. at
647.
297. Id. at 650. See generally supra Part II.B. 1 (discussing contributory liability).
298. Aimster If, 334 F.3d at 650.
One who, knowing or strongly suspecting that he is involved in shady dealings, takes
steps to make sure that he does not acquire full or exact knowledge of the nature and
extent of those dealings is held to have a [guilty] intent ...because a deliberate effort
to avoid guilty knowledge is all that the law requires to establish a guilty state of mind.
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a contributory infringer. 299 Encryption did not exonerate an otherwise
culpable party, however. 30 0 Thus, the court affirmed the district court's
conclusion that Aimster had the requisite knowledge for contributory
30 1
liability.
The Seventh Circuit refused to separate Club Aimster from Classic
Aimster because the fees obtained by users of Club Aimster financed
Aimster exclusively. 30 2 Also, the court reasoned that the tutorial on the
website, which featured illustrations of music pirating, was essentially

an invitation to infringe-the sort of inducement absent in the facts of
Sony. 30 3 Additionally, Aimster listed top-forty selections on its website
and allowed for an automatic download option of those works that
tended to be copyrighted. 304 The tutorial, the top-forty selection listing,
and the automatic download option pointed to the material contribution
the court found
element necessary for contributory liability. 30 5 In sum,
30 6

the application of contributory liability appropriate.

299. Id. Encryption allows for increased privacy, which the Seventh Circuit characterized as
both "a social benefit" and "a source of social costs." Id. It is critical to the acceptance of instant
messaging for "some industries and federal agencies." Id. America Online had plans to offer an
encrypted version of its instant messaging service, a decision the appellate court characterized as
"alarming" as well as "paradoxical, since subsidiaries of AOL's parent company... are among
the plaintiffs in this case." Id. at 649. Additional social benefits of encryption include allowing
"users to engage in political speech without fear of retribution, to engage in whistle-blowing
while greatly reducing the risk of detection, and to seek advice about embarrassing personal
problems without fear of discovery." A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of
Regulatory Arbitrage (writing generally about anonymous communications, not specifically
encryption), in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 129, 133-34 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds.,1997),
available at http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/arbitr.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2003).
Likewise, encryption technology also has costs, such as reducing "the chances of identifying the
authors of libel, hate speech and other undesirable communications." Id. at 134; see also A.
Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital
Cash, and DistributedDatabases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 402 (1996) ("There is no consensus, nor
is there likely to be, as to whether, on balance, anonymity is a good [because it] has both valuable
and harmful consequences.").
300. Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 650-51. The court focused its rationale, stating that "a service
provider that would otherwise be a contributory infringer does not obtain immunity by using
encryption to shield itself from actual knowledge of the unlawful purposes for which the service
is being used." Id.
301. Id. at 650.
302. Id. at 652.
303. Id. at 651.
304. Id. at 652.
305. See id. at 651-52 (discussing the tutorial, the top-forty listings, and the auto-play button
as reasons why contributory liability is appropriate, but not specifically referring to the element of
material contribution).
306. Id. at 654.
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b. Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine

The Seventh Circuit recognized that the interpretation of just how far
the Supreme Court's decision in Sony reached was outcome
determinative and that this was the principal divisive issue between the
parties. 30 7
Furthermore, in its interpretation of Sony, the court
underscored the Supreme Court's concern in Sony about unduly
extending copyright holders' dominion to include a monopoly over the
technology. 30 8 The court appreciated the value of instant messaging
and file-swapping technology generally and carefully30 9 differentiated
Aimster from the more general forms of the technology.
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit rejected the recording industry's
assertion that the staple article of commerce doctrine was inapplicable
to services because of the implicit continuing relationship between the
parties. 3 10 Instead of agreeing with the categorical inapplicability of the
doctrine to services, as the recording industry suggested, the court found
that the ability of the service provider, or indeed a product
manufacturer, to affect the ability of the end users to infringe should
receive consideration. 3 1 1 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit noted that
Sony could have reengineered the Betamax to eliminate, or at least
reduce, the ability of its customers to use it for infringing purposes, a
3 12
factor not discussed in the majority opinion in Sony.
In interpreting the Sony Court's rationale, the court noted that the
Betamax at issue in Sony was used for both infringing and noninfringing
uses, yet the Court held that the VCR was a staple article of

307.

Id. at 647.

308. Id. at 648. See generally supra Part I.C. 1 (discussing the Sony decision).
309. Aimster H, 334 F.3d at 647, 648-49. The Seventh Circuit characterized file-sharing
systems generally as capable of "innocuous purposes such as the expeditious exchange of
confidential business data among employees of a business firm." Id. at 647. Furthermore, the
court took the recording industry's argument-that the service provider's ability to control the
end use makes it a contributory infringer-to its next logical step, applying it to instant messaging
services generally. Id. at 648. Judge Posner found the rule would be "highly burdensome" for
the service providers to detect and prevent those noninfringing uses, and would therefore be
"contrary to the clear import of the Sony decision." Id. at 648-49.
310. Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 648. See generally supra Part II.C.I (discussing the Sony
decision and the staple article of commerce doctrine).
311. AimsterI, 334 F.3d at 648.
312. Id. Sony could have "eliminat[ed] the fast-forward capability" to prevent the user from
skipping commercials or could have "enabl[ed] broadcasters by scrambling their signal[s] to
disable the Betamax from recording their programs (for that matter, it could have been engineered
to have only a play, not a recording capability)." Id. See generally supra Part II.C.I (discussing

the Sony decision).
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commerce. 3 13 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit determined that the
Napster court erred when it suggested that knowledge of specific
infringing uses alone was sufficient to affix liability under a
contributory theory. 3 14 The court also rejected Aimster's argument that
the recording industry must prove financial harm to prevail.3 15 The
court noted that, like nominal damages for a trespass claim, in the act of
direct copyright infringement, the actor is culpable regardless of
16
resulting harm.

3

Additionally, the Seventh Circuit accepted Aimster's contention that
its services could be used in noninfringing endeavors but found that this
fact alone was inadequate to place Aimster's service among staple
articles of commerce. 3 17 A mere potential legitimate use, without some
showing of actual or probable use, is insufficient. 3 18 The court explored
several potential noninfringing uses. 3 19 Ultimately, however, the court
found that Aimster failed to meet its burden of showing the frequency
with which its service was utilized for noninfringing purposes, or even

313. Id. at 649. Explaining the apparent disconnect, the appellate court determined that the
Supreme Court "was unwilling to allow copyright holders to prevent infringement effectuated by
means of a new technology at the price of possibly denying noninfringing customers the benefit
of the technology." Id. See generally supra Part I.C. 1 (discussing Sony and the staple article of
commerce doctrine).
314. Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 649; see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 2 COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2, at 6:12-1
(2d ed. 2003) (noting that the requirement that a contributory infringer supply materials to enable
direct infringement is different from the requirement of actual knowledge); supra notes 184-86
and accompanying text (discussing the Napster court's analysis of knowledge element).
315. AimsterI, 334 F.3d at 649.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 651. Aimster argued that all it "has to show in order to escape liability for
contributory infringement is that its file-sharing system could be used in noninfringing ways,
which obviously it could be." Id. The court analogized to the law of aiding and abetting to
illustrate the difference between blameworthy and innocent behaviors. Id. As the court
explained:
A retailer of slinky dresses is not guilty of aiding and abetting prostitution even if he
knows that some of his customers are prostitutes-he may even know which ones
are.... But the owner of a massage parlor who employs women who are capable of
giving massages, but in fact as he knows sell only sex and never massages to their
customers, is an aider and abettor of prostitution ....
Id. (citation omitted).
318. Id. at 651.
319. Id. at 652-53. The noninfringing uses discussed by the court included: 1) the exchange
of non-copyrighted music; 2) using music as online "currency in the music-sharing community,
since someone who only downloads and never uploads, thus acting as a pure free rider, will not
be very popular"; 3) networked buddy-lists and chat-rooms that may promote the exchange of
ideas and opinions about popular music; 4) the encryption feature itself, which may allow the
exchange of "off-color, but not copyrighted, photographs, or dirty jokes, or other forms of
expression that people like to keep private"; and 5) space-shifting as a fair use of the copyrighted
works. Id.
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that it was ever utilized for such legitimate purposes.3 20 Even if
Aimster had met this burden, the Seventh Circuit would require a
further showing, if the infringing uses were substantial, that the cost to
the party of reducing or eliminating the infringing use would be unduly
burdensome. 32 1 Therefore, the court found
the staple article of
322
Aimster.
to
inapplicable
doctrine
commerce

c. Vicarious Liability
The Seventh Circuit evaluated the district court's reasoning as to
vicarious liability and found itself "less confident than the district
[court]" that the appellees would prevail on the merits. 32 3 The court
noted that vicarious liability applies to an agency relationship or a
relationship analogous to agency. 324
However, the court found
unnecessary the resolution of whether vicarious liability extends far
enough to implicate Aimster, having already determined that Aimster
325
was contributorily liable.
d. Safe Harbor Provisions
Finally, the court evaluated the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA
and found, like the district court, that Aimster was not eligible for safe
harbor protection. 326 Although the legislature enacted the safe harbor
provisions for Internet service providers ("ISPs") rather than fileswapping software, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court
that the legislature had drafted the definitions broadly enough to

320. Id. at 653. The court determined that the evidence shifted "the burden of production to
Aimster to demonstrate that its service has substantial noninfringing uses."
Id. at 652.
Furthermore, it was "not enough that a product or service be physically capable, as it were, of a
noninfringing use." Id. at 653. Also, the court ruled that the district court did not err in denying
an evidentiary hearing, because Aimster would have needed to show that there was a genuine and
material factual dispute and that it planned "to introduce evidence that if believed will so weaken
the moving party's case as to affect the judge's decision on whether to issue an injunction." Id. at
653-54.
321. Id. at 653. The court seemed to indicate that if Aimster had shown that the encryption
feature added value to the service, then it might have met this added burden. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 654 ("[W]e are less confident than the district judge was that the recording industry
would also be likely to prevail on the issue of vicarious infringement should the case be tried.").
324. Id. The court evaluated the dance hall cases as an example of a non-agency relationship
sufficiently analogous to invoke vicarious liability. Id. For a further discussion of the dance hall
cases, see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (contrasting the dance hall cases with the
landlord-tenant cases to establish the contours of vicarious liability applicability).
325. Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 654-55.
326. Id. at 655. The DMCA "provides a series of safe harbors for Internet service providers
and related entities, but none in which Aimster can moor." Id.
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encompass Aimster. 327 However, the Seventh Circuit noted that for the
safe harbor provisions to shield a party from liability, the entity seeking
asylum must make certain efforts to reduce or eliminate repeat
infringement. 32 8 The court found that Aimster did not engage in such
efforts; instead, Aimster encouraged and invited infringement and was
329
unable to prevent infringement due to the encrypted transactions.
Thus, the safe harbor provisions did nothing to protect Aimster from
liability. 330 Moreover, a discussion of the merits rendered the same
conclusion as the district court-the recording industry would likely
prevail should the case be tried.33 1
B. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
In MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, a file-sharing case with facts and
arguments similar to those in Aimster reached the courts in the Central
District of California. 332 The Grokster court noted that the defendants
may have purposefully structured their software and services to reap the
benefits of infringement without accruing liability but deferred that
question to the legislature. 333 The Grokster court determined that
contributory liability did not apply because Grokster lacked the requisite
knowledge. 334 Furthermore, the court concluded that the defendants
were not susceptible to vicarious liability because they could not control
335
the behavior of their users.
1. Facts
On April 25, 2003, Judge Stephen V. Wilson of the Central District
of California determined that Grokster escaped liability under facts

327. Id.; see also supra note 156 (providing a statutory definition of service provider for
purposes of the DMCA's safe harbor provisions).
328. Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 655. "The common element of its safe harbors is that the service
provider must do what it can reasonably be asked to do to prevent the use of its service by 'repeat
infringers."' Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2000)).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(reaching a conclusion opposite to that of the Aimster court and utilizing different rationale based
on similar facts).
333. Id. at 1046.
334. Id. at 1043; see also infra Part III.B.2 (examining the Grokster court's analysis of
contributory liability).
335. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045-46; see also infra Part II.B.3 (exploring the court's
vicarious liability rationale).
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similar to Aimster.336

This case consolidated two actions against

Grokster, StreamCast, and Kazaa for contributory and vicarious liability
brought by motion picture studios as well as record companies. 3 37 The

parties cross-motioned for summary judgment, citing no issues of
338

material fact.
The defendants all used FastTrack network software developed by
the makers of Kazaa. 339 Individual users downloaded the technology
340
employed by the defendants and used it to transfer files of any type.
By launching the software, the user automatically connected to a peerto-peer network and files were available to be shared. 34 1 The software
contained other "incidental features," which improved the functionality
of the software. 34 2 To determine whether this software violated
copyright law, the court analyzed both the contributory and vicarious
343
theories of liability.
2. Contributory Liability
The court found, as did the Aimster and Napstercourts, that some end
users of the system engaged in infringing behavior and met the
threshold direct liability element of third-party liability. 344 The court
interpreted the knowledge element as requiring actual knowledge by the
defendants of specific direct infringement by its end users. 34 5 The court

336. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1031, 1043, 1046; see also supra Part III.A.1 (discussing
the facts of the Aimster case). The court entered a default judgment against Kazaa because its
parent company, Kazaa BV, failed to defend the suit; therefore, its decision does not apply to
Kazaa. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1032 n.2. Kazaa's owners, Sharman Networks Ltd., have
filed suit against entertainment companies for copyright infringement, alleging that the industry
utilizes unauthorized copies of its software to access the networks. Kazaa's Owners Turn Tables,
File Copyright Suit Against Record Labels, THE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 24, 2003, available at
http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/6849062.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2003). The
suit also alleges that the industry's use of the system violates the terms for using the network and
also revives antitrust claims against the industry. Id.
337. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1031 & n.1.
338. Id. at 1031.
339. Id. at 1032. StreamCast now uses the Morpheus software from the open source Gnutella.
Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1033 (stating that the incidental features include "[flacilities for organizing,
viewing and playing media files, and for communicating with other users").
343. Id. at 1034-39, 1043-45.
344. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013-14 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2001);
Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1034-35; Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 648 (N.D. I11.2002). See
generally supra Part II.F (discussing the Napster case); supra Part IH.A (discussing the Aimster
decision).
345. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
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relied on Sony, noting that the Supreme Court refused to affix liability
on the basis that the defendants knew generally that their products were
being used for infringing purposes. 346 Specifically, the court stated that
constructive knowledge was insufficient to establish contributory
347
liability under the staple article of commerce analysis.
Unlike Aimster, however, the court found the software capable 3of
48
substantial noninfringing use within the meaning of Sony.
Specifically, the software could be used to transfer non-copyrighted
materials, such as Shakespeare's works, free songs, and movie trailers,
and was regularly used to search for government documents,
nonproprietary computer software, and media content. 34 9 The court
350
stressed the importance of looking at future and current system uses.
Moreover, the plaintiffs in this case did not dispute the current and
future potential for noninfringing uses. 35 1 On this basis, the court held
that constructive knowledge was insufficient; thus, to be liable,
352
defendants must be aware of specific instances of infringement.
Relying on Napster's analysis, the court determined that the
defendants were liable only if they knew of specific items of
infringement and failed to act on that knowledge. 35 3 The court further
adopted the Netcom approach that knowledge of specific infringement
must coincide with the ability to prevent the infringement. 354 On the
issue of knowledge, the plaintiffs' evidence was similar to that used in
Napster: the defendants marketed themselves as the next Napster; the
defendants' internal documents showed knowledge; and the plaintiffs
sent notices of infringement to the defendants. 35 5 Therefore, liability
hinged on the material contribution prong of contributory liability. 356 If

346. Id. See generally supra Part I.C. 1 (discussing the Sony decision).
347. Grokster,259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035; see also supra Part H.C. 1 (discussing the staple article
of commerce doctrine).
348. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035; see also supra Part II.C.1 (exploring the rationale of
the Sony decision).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 1036 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2001)).
351. Grokster,259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
352. Id. at 1036.
353. Id.; see also supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Napster court's
treatment of the knowledge element).
354. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1037; see also supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text
(noting the Netcom court's finding that knowledge must coincide with the ability to address the

infringement).
355.
356.

Grokster,259 F. Supp. 2d at 1036-37.
Id. at 1038.
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the defendants materially contributed to the infringing activities,
then
35 7
they were in a position to do something about the infringement.
The court distinguished the defendants' software from the scheme
evaluated in Napster.358 Napster was an integrated service that
provided the "site and facilities" that enabled user infringement, similar
to the swap meet host in Fonovisa.359 The centralized database in
Napster provided the axis of the network, and if the company's doors
closed, the network would likewise cease. 360
Unlike Napster,
Grokster's network was not centralized; thus, the searching required
other means. 36 1 Also significant to the district court's reasoning was
that the FastTrack software utilized by Grokster was proprietary, and
thus, Grokster had no control over the technical processes. 3 62 The
software employed by StreamCast required a different analysis because
it utilized the Morpheus software, which StreamCast owned and
controlled and which was based on the open-source Gnutella
platform. 36 3 StreamCast's scheme was even more decentralized than
Grokster's system.

364

357. See id. (explaining that liability exists if the defendant engages in conduct that materially
contributes to infringement).
358. Id. at 1039-40; see also supra note 175 and accompanying text (highlighting the
centralized aspects of Napster's service).
359. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001); Grokster, 259
F. Supp. 2d at 1038; see also supra Part II.C.2 (discussing Fonovisa); supra notes 189-93 and
accompanying text (outining the Napstercourt's reliance on Fonovisa).
360. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1040; see also supra note 175 and accompanying text
(highlighting the centralized aspects of Napster's service).
361. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1040 (stating that the super-node process of locating files
occurs independent of Grokster). See generally supra note 197 and accompanying text
(explaining Grokster's super-node technology).
362. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1040.
363. Id. at 1041. Open source refers to:
Free source code of a program, which is made available to the development
community at large. The rationale is that a broader group of programmers will
ultimately produce a more useful and more bug-free product for everyone, especially
because more people will be reviewing the code. Peer review is considered one of the
most important safeguards to prevent buggy code, but is often not given enough, if any,
attention by software companies. Peer review is a natural byproduct of open source
projects.
In addition to having better code, open source software allows an organization to
modify the product for its own use rather than hope that the vendor of a proprietary
product will implement its suggestions in a subsequent release....
Examples of popular open source programs are the Apache Web server, sendmail
mail server and Linux operating system. Netscape Communicator was made open
source in 1998 (see Mozilla). For more information, visit www.opensource.org.
TECHWEB, TECH ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://www.techweb.comencyclopedia (last visited Nov. 23,
2003).
364. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041.
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Based on these attributes of the defendants' software and scheme, the
court concluded that neither defendant provided sites or facilities for the
365
infringing behavior within the meaning of Fonovisa or Napster.
After downloading the software, users only had minimal relationships
with the defendants, such that the relationships did not amount to the
366
material or substantial contribution on the part of the defendants.
Thus, the court determined that Grokster could not be liable under a
3 67
contributory theory.
3.

Vicarious Liability

Even though the software was provided by the defendants free of
charge, the court found a financial benefit because the promise of
36 8
exchanging copyrighted materials acted as a "draw" for the services.
This translated into a financial benefit through consideration of
3 69
advertising revenue.
On the issue of control, the Grokster court examined the standard set
forth in Fonovisa, reasoning that any ability to supervise or terminate
370
the users' ability to utilize the system was sufficient to find control.
Despite plaintiffs' evidence that the defendants could modify their
software to screen out copyrighted materials, the court determined that
because the network was decentralized and independent of the
defendants, no obligation to police the networks existed.3 7 1 Therefore,
the court concluded that the defendants escaped liability for copyright
infringement by their end users under both contributory and vicarious
3 72
theories.

365. Id. ("[I]f either [Grokster or StreamCast] closed their doors and deactivated all computers
within their control, users of their products could continue sharing files with little or no
interruption.").
366. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1042 (noting the "isolated technical support e-mails" sent to
aid users having difficulty with the downloaded files and the discussions between end users about
the "propriety of exchanging copyrighted files").
367. Id. at 1043.
368. Id. at 1043-44 (analogizing Grokster's service with swap meet in Fonovisa).
369. Id. at 1044.
370. Id. at 1044-45 (citing with approval the Aimster court's application of the control
element-that "thc defendant had the ability to terminate users and control access to the system"
-which implicated Aimster's vicarious liability); see also Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 655
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that the defendants had control over Aimster users); supra Part II.C.2
(discussing Fonovisa).
371. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
372. Id. at 1031, 1043, 1045-46.
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C. Points of Divergence Between Aimster and Grokster
The courts differed not only in their ultimate conclusions of liability
373
but also in their application of existing law to relatively similar facts.
The courts disagreed in their analysis of: 1) the staple article of
commerce doctrine, 2) the knowledge element of contributory liability,

3) willful

ignorance,

4) the material contribution

element of

contributory liability, and 5) the requisite level of control needed to
374
establish vicarious liability.
First, the Aimster court determined that the staple article of
commerce doctrine could not protect Aimster from liability. 37 5 The
doctrine, according to the Seventh Circuit, required not only that the
system be capable of noninfringing uses, but also that individuals
probably would use the system for those noninfringing purposes. 37 6 In
contrast, the Grokster court found the software capable of substantial

noninfringing uses, a fact sufficient
to place Grokster within the staple
37 7

article of commerce doctrine.
Second, the courts differed in their application of the knowledge
element of contributory infringement. 378 The Aimster court found
actual knowledge based on the facts of the case, despite the lack of
specific information. 379
The Grokster court found the lack of
specificity in the knowledge fatal to the record company's case of
380
contributory liability.
Third, the courts diverged on the impact of willful ignorance. 38 1 The
Aimster court accepted the defendants' contention that their encryption
373. Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643, 656 (7th Cir. 2003); Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
374. In some respects, the divergent facts of the cases presented compelling reasons for
divergent conclusions. For example, Grokster actively pursued noninfringing uses through
partnerships with independent artists. Brief for Appellee at 17, Grokster (Nos. 03-55894, 0355901),
available
at
http://www.eff.com/IP/P2P/MGM-v_Grokster/20030917_grokster_
appeal.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). On the other hand, Aimster demonstrated intent to market
its services to would-be direct infringers, evidenced by the tutorial featuring copyrighted music as
well as the top-forty listing. Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 651. Furthermore, although both cases
applied the Sony decision, the Seventh Circuit was not bound to follow Napster or Fonovisa, two
Ninth Circuit decisions, and thus, the relevant precedential law differs among the circuits. See
generally supra Parts II.F and II.C.2 (discussing Fonovisa and Napster, respectively).
375. Aimsterl, 334 F.3d at 651,653.
376. Id. at 650, 653. As evidence of the need to look to potential as well as actual uses, the
court noted that as a result of VCR technology, "[a]n enormous new market thus opened for the
movie industry." Id. at 650.
377. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
378. Compare Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 650-51, with Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035-38.
379. Aimster I1, 334 F.3d at 650.
380. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
381. Compare Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 650, with Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
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technology prevented them from acquiring specific knowledge of
infringement, but found that encryption use alone did not prove lack of
knowledge. 382 The Grokster court acknowledged that the defendant,
Grokster, likely designed its technology and business model
purposefully to avoid liability. 383 Yet, the court still mechanically
applied the law, finding a lack of meritorious claims as to third-party
384
liability.
Fourth, on the issue of material contribution, the two courts again
parted company. 385 The Grokster court found no ongoing relationship
between the parties. 386 Because of Club Aimster, the Aimster court
found an extensive ongoing relationship between the parties. 387 This
point of divergence represents a difference in the facts rather than a
38 8
distinguishable application of the law.
Finally, both courts determined that the defendants received a
financial benefit from the infringing activities. 389 Even in Grokster,
where the end users did not explicitly pay a monthly fee for the
services, the court noted that the infringing activity acted as an
enticement for downloading the software. 390 Yet, the courts differed in
their findings of control-that is, the right and ability of each company
to supervise the actions of its users. 39 1 The Grokster court found no
ability to supervise, even if software modifications could have been
made to restrict copyrighted materials. 39 2 In short, the Grokster and
Aimster courts applied the law differently and reached divergent
3 93
conclusions.

382. Aimster H, 334 F.3d at 650.
383. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
384. Id. at 1045-46.
385. Compare Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 651-52, with Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1038-43.
386. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1042.
387. Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 653 (N.D. I11.2002).
388. See id. at 644-65 (describing attributes of Club Aimster).
389. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043-44; Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 654-55. Because
the appellate court did not conclusively determine whether Aimster could be vicariously liable,
the points of divergence on vicarious liability refer to the district court analysis. See Aimster I,
252 F. Supp. 2d. at 654-55 (describing the plaintiffs likelihood of success on a vicarious
infringement claim).
390. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1044.
391. Compare id. at 1045, with Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 655. Again, factual differences
between the cases drove the variant conclusions: Club Aimster utilized a website with a
password, demonstrating a continued relationship between the parties and an ability to restrict
users' access. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 655.
392. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
393. See Borland, supra note 7.
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IV.

ANALYSIS

This Part begins with an analysis of the staple article of commerce
doctrine, concluding that its application to file-trading tools is not only
appropriate but also that substantial noninfringing uses of the
technology exist. 394 Then, this Part explores contributory liability in the
context of digital piracy.3 95 Next, this Part turns to a discussion of
imposing vicarious liability on the makers and distributors of filethis Part scrutinizes application of the DMCA
sharing tools. 39 6 Finally,
397
safe harbor provisions.
A. Application of the Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine
The staple article of commerce doctrine is significant in the context
of file-swapping software because the application of the doctrine is
dispositive. 398 The district court in Aimster failed to apply the staple
article of commerce doctrine, neglecting to examine properly both the
legal doctrine and the implications of the technology. 399 The appellate
court properly rectified this oversight and considered the staple article
of commerce doctrine. 40 0 However, the appellate court held that
insufficient
Aimster failed to meet its burden because it had offered
401
evidence to establish the existence of noninfringing uses.
1. Policy Rationale Underlying Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine
The policy underlying the staple article of commerce doctrine
coincides with public policy considerations, as well as the overarching
goals of intellectual property law, namely to promote progress in the

394. See infra Part IV.A (considering the staple article of commerce doctrine).
395. See infra Part IV.B (examining the knowledge element of contributory liability).
396. See infra Part IV.C (appraising vicarious liability).
397. See infra Part IV.D (investigating the DMCA safe harbor provisions).
398. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 426-27, 456 (1984)
(outlining the staple article of commerce doctrine). Both the Aimster and Grokstercourts applied
the Sony rationale, but differed as to whether the new generation of file-swapping software was
distinguishable from the VCRs that were at issue in Sony. Compare Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d
634, 653-54 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (distinguishing Aimster's service from Sony's Betamax product
because Aimster maintained ongoing relationships with customers and the use could not be
characterized as private), with MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035
(C.D. Cal. 2003) (finding Grokster's file-swapping software capable of substantial noninfringing
uses, and therefore within the staple article of commerce doctrine espoused in Sony).
399. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 653-54 (finding Sony inapplicable).
400. Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643, 651-53 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying the Sony doctrine and
analyzing the sufficiency of potential noninfringing uses).
401. Id. at 653 (finding inadequate proof of substantiality of noninfringing uses).
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arts and sciences. 40 2 The Grokster court correctly recognized that
industrial advancement and substantial consumer benefit balance

favorably against some infringing activity, allowing some infringement
to continue for the overall good of the general public. 40 3 The policy
rationale appears sound: to allow copyright law to impede technology
produces a result antithetical to the law's intended purpose. 40 4 The
Grokster court correctly heeded the Supreme Court's instructions that
when applying copyright law to a new technology, the law must be
40 5
interpreted in light of its overarching goals.
2. Technological Attributes
The district court in Aimster suggested that attributes of the
technology itself made it ineligible for protection under Sony's staple
article of commerce doctrine. 40 6 For example, the district court in
Aimster suggested that the software was distinguishable from a VCR
because the VCR is a discrete, free-standing product rather than a
bundled service. 4 07 Also, the technology's potential for distribution
made it inherently different from the VCR in Sony, which had no
similar capability. 40 8 Although that distinction may mean that the users
of file-sharing software are ineligible for fair use defenses, the

402. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (explaining the staple article of commerce doctrine in relation to
VCRs). See generally Grokster Ruling Sparks Reaction; RIAA Vows to Appeal, 4 ANDREWS EBus. L. BULL. NO. 10 (June 2003) (comparing file-swapping software to photocopiers and
VCRs), availableat Westlaw 4 No. 10 ANEBUSLB 1.
403. See Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035-36 (finding that substantial noninfringing uses
balance favorably against the technology's potential for infringement); Larocque, supra note 50,
at 790 (contending that the scope and duration of the infringement are significant in the court's
balancing of competing interests inherent in the Sony decision). According to Larocque, the
Napster decision represents a shift from Sony, in which courts put less weight on the consumer
benefit of the technology. Id. at 791; see also Fagin et al., supra note 163, at 479-80 (arguing
that Napster takes a narrow view of the Sony defense). See generally supra Part I!.F (discussing
the Napster case).
404. Fagin et al., supra note 163, at 498-99 (arguing that copyright law, as currently written,
"threatens technological development by (i) giving content owners de facto control over new
technologies of distribution, (ii) failing to encourage the development of (fair) use technologies,
and (iii) giving content owners control over every step in the chain of distribution").
405. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 431-32, 442 (discussing previous cases where striking a balance
between public interests and copyright holder protections influenced analyses); Grokster, 259 F.
Supp. 2d at 1035-36 (allowing intent of copyright law to supersede limited infringement). See
generally supra Part II.C. 1 (discussing Sony).
406. See, e.g., Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 653-54 (N.D. It1. 2002).
407. Id. at 653.
408. Larocque, supra note 50, at 791 (reasoning that variant conclusions of Napster and Sony
are attributable to the world-wide implications of Napster use, that "one Napster user could
distribute essentially perfect copies worldwide in a matter of minutes creating significant and far
reaching harmful effects").
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distinction9 should not make a difference as to application of the Sony
40
defense.
Clearly, the file-swapping technology is different from the
technology utilized in Sony, but the overall principle is the same-that

courts must analyze new technologies in light of the purposes
Other useful technological devices
underlying copyright law. 4 10
the
framework
for
distribution,
such as fax machines, e-mail,
provide
4
1
1
Yet, that attribute alone is not enough to
and instant messaging.
remove the items from coverage under the staple article of commerce
4 13
If
doctrine. 4 12 Technology is merely a tool capable of multiple uses.
a new technological innovation meets the requirements of the Sony
defense, that does not necessitate sanctioning every conceivable use of
that software. 4 14 On the contrary, a user may not employ a VCR to
copy a movie from another videotape, because that would subject the
user to liability. 4 15 Similarly, although users may permissively engage

409. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (outlining the staple article of commerce doctrine as requiring
substantial noninfringing uses, not necessarily fair uses). The appellate court in Aimster negated
this reasoning employed by the district court. Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2003).
Instead of making the software ineligible for protection under the staple article of commerce
doctrine, the appellate court determined that the fact that Aimster was a service tended to show
that it retained some control over how its product was used, which was a factor to be considered
when applying the Sony defense. Id.
410. Sony, 464 U.S. at 432.
411. See TECHWEB, supra note 363 (providing definitions of fax, e-mail, and instant
messaging and noting the distribution capabilities of each).
412. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (outlining the staple article of commerce doctrine
requirements); see also Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 648 (applying the staple article of commerce
doctrine, but finding proof insufficient to establish the element).
413. See Grokster Ruling Sparks Reaction, supra note 402 (reporting that after the Grokster
ruling, a representative of the Electronic Frontier Foundation stated, "[T]he Morpheus case is
about technology, not piracy, and today the court agreed, making it clear that technology
companies are not responsible for every misuse of the tools they make.").
414. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (balancing legitimate use against infringing use).
415. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & West Supp. 2002) (granting a fight of reproduction to copyright
owners). The FBI warns users of liability at the beginning of copyrighted movies on
videocassettes:
WARNING
Federal law provides severe civil and criminal penalties for the unauthorized
reproduction, distribution or exhibition of copyrighted motion pictures, video tapes or
video discs.
Criminal copyright infringement is investigated by the FBI and may constitute a
felony with a maximum penalty of up to five years in prison and/or a $250,000 fine.
Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.comell.edu/copyright/courses/law4l0/topicOl/
fbiwarning.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2003). By way of analogy, "[s]elling someone a car does
not make one liable for the subsequent vehicular manslaughter committed by the driver, even if
that crime could not have been committed without the car." Brief for Appellee Grokster, Ltd., at
30, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, appeal docketed, Nos. 03-55894,
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in file-trading
4 16
infringe.
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uses by individuals may

still

3. File-trading Viewed as a Service: the Long Term Relationship of
the Parties
The district court in Aimster found the Sony doctrine inapplicable to
services, which necessitate a long-term relationship between the parties,
a view not shared by the Seventh Circuit.4 17 Likewise, the Seventh

Circuit found that the Sony doctrine was inapplicable because of the
marketing behaviors of the companies promoting their file-swapping
4 18
software.
However, the relationship that existed in Aimster because of Club
Aimster is not inherent in the file-swapping software; the technology
itself is capable of functioning without continued contact between the
manufacturer and the end user. 4 19 By its terms, the staple article of
commerce doctrine applies to products, or articles, not to conduct.4 2 °
Although it is true that some companies perpetuate the abuse of the
software and its illegal use, the technology itself is not prone to such

03-55901 (9th Cir. 2003), available at http://www.eff.com/IP/P2P/MGM vGrokster/
20030917-grokster appeal brief.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2003).
416. See Grokster Ruling Sparks Reaction, supra note 402 (comparing file-swapping software
to photocopiers and VCRs).
417. AimsterH, 334 F.3d at 648; Aimster , 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 653 (N.D. 111.2002).
418. Kimberly D. Simon, Note, EstablishingAccountability on the Digital Frontier: Liability
for Third Party Copyright Infringement Extends to Manufacturers of Audio Compression
Software, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 921, 941 (2002).
419. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 653 (referring to the ongoing relationship of the parties).
The appellate court determined that Club Aimster and Classic Aimster could not be discussed
separately because Club Aimster's monthly fee constituted Aimster's sole means of financing.
Aimster H, 334 F.3d at 652. For an example of a utilization of the technology without
necessitating a continuing relationship, see MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d
1029, 1041 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that if the company's doors closed, the users' activities
would continue uninterrupted). For a description of the functionality of decentralized software
that emerged after Napster,see Fagin et al., supra note 163, at 461.
420. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442; see also supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the
rationale for the staple article of commerce doctrine grounded in the legitimate public use of the
product). Clearly, a party's behavior may also subject it to liability, but that conduct should be
evaluated separately because liability would stem from actions rather than use of the technology,
thus no longer implicating the legitimate uses of the technology. See Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 651
(evaluating Aimster's behavior in terms of aiding and abetting law, but not separating the
behavioral aspects from the product offered).
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criticism. 42 1 In fact, the technology is capable of many uses beyond
422
copyright infringement.
Also, an ongoing relationship between the parties is significant to a
determination of vicarious liability, rather than contributory liability,
which instead is concerned with the relationship between the party and
the act of infringement. 423 Yet, the staple article of commerce doctrine
applies as a defense only to contributory liability, rendering the
argument less persuasive. 424 Furthermore, the Sony defense does not
refer to the purpose for which something was created, but instead to the
functions for which it may be used.4 25
4. Substantial Noninfringing Uses
Peer-to-peer technology has the potential for substantial
noninfringing use, measured not only by current uses but also by the
potential for future uses. 4 26 The Grokster court explored some of the
noninfringing uses, both actual and potential, and correctly found that
the software could be and was used for a number of legitimate,

421. Fagin et al., supra note 163, at 503 (explaining that the same technology that Napster
used to promote illegal activity has the potential to "advance the underlying goals of copyright
law").
422. See infra part IV.A.4 (analyzing the noninfringing uses of file-sharing software).
423. See Larocque, supra note 50, at 772 (exploring the requisite relationship to evoke thirdparty theories of liability); supra note 50 and accompanying text (differentiating contributory and
vicarious liability in terms of the relationship each examines).
424. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (stating that the staple article of commerce
doctrine applies only to contributory liability). The Sony decision placed emphasis on the fact
that the relationship between the parties did not extend beyond the moment of sale. Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 438 (1984). See supra note 96 and
accompanying text for a further description of this aspect of the Sony decision. The Supreme
Court in Sony did not differentiate between contributory and vicarious liability, despite the
current consensus that the two theories exist as separate causes of third-party liability. See Sony,
464 U.S. at 435 n.17; see also supra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining how the Sony
court compared contributory and vicarious liability). Admittedly, the relationship between the
parties may bear on the relationship between the defendant and the act of infringement; however,
those making the argument fail to make that critical inferential step. See, e.g., Aimster 1, 252 F.
Supp. 2d at 653 (stating that the relationship between the parties negates application of the staple
article of commerce doctrine). The appellate court rectified this gap in logic, reasoning that "the
provider of a service, unlike the seller of a product, has a continuing relation with its customers
and therefore should be able to prevent, or at least limit, their infringing copyright." Aimster /1,
334 F.3d at 648.
425. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
426. Fagin et al., supra note 163, at 501-02 ("File-sharing technology has the potential to do
far more than channel illicit content," but "exists as a generalized means of information
production and exchange."); see, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 442; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2001); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d
1029, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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noninfringing purposes. 4 27 The technology has the potential for the
quick and cheap exchange of information, revolutionary distribution
channels, and diverse cultural access. 42 8 Additionally, it has potential
for marketing4 2 9 and community development.4 3 °
The Aimster court also explored possible noninfringing uses of the
software, but found that the appellants failed to meet their burden on the
issue. 43 1 The legitimate uses explored by the court included copying
non-copyrighted materials, establishing communities for the exchange

of ideas, and creating private communications between members of
those communities. 432 However, the Aimster court reasoned that the
capability of the software for legitimate purposes fell short of
implicating the Sony rationale. 43 3 The Aimster court's reasoning
peer-to-peer
explicitly accepted the possibility of protection for
4 34
uses.
legitimate
of
showing
a
upon
software
networking
Furthermore, a relatively small number of players dominate the music
recording industry; thus, they have an incentive to protect their
concentration of popularity and wealth. 4 35 However, the peer-to-peer
427. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (enumerating noninfringing uses, including "to
facilitate and search for public domain materials, government documents, media content for
which distribution is authorized, media content as which the rights owners do not object to
distribution, and computer software for which distribution is permitted").
428. See Fagin et al., supra note 163, at 502 (citing Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin or
Linus and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002)).
429. See id. at 504 (contending that because of the interactivity of the system, users' tastes are
developed and recorded, offering potential for gathering information to be used for marketing
purposes).
430. See id. at 503-04 (likening the development of P2P networks to the communal
innovation that advanced the Internet itself). Also, the interactive nature of the networks permits
the diversification of tastes and increases exposure to less-well-known artists. Id.
431. Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643,652(7th Cir. 2003).
432. Id.
433. Id. at 653. According to the court, "It is not enough... that a product or service be
Id.
I..."
physically capable.., of a noninfringing use .
434. Id. at 652.
The evidence that we have summarized does not exclude the possibility of substantial
noninfringing uses of the Aimster system, but the evidence is insufficient, especially in
a preliminary-injunction proceeding, which is summary in character, to shift the burden
of production to Aimster to demonstrate that its service has substantial noninfringing
uses.
Id.
435. See Fagin et al., supra note 163, at 490-91 (explaining the oligopolistic nature of the
music recording industry). As Machiavelli remarked, "[A]n innovator has as enemies all the
people who were doing well under the old order, and only halfhearted defenders in those who
hope to profit from the new." Brief for Appellee Grokster, Ltd., at 30, MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, appeal docketed, Nos. 03-55894, 03-55901 (9th Cir. 2003)
(quoting from Machiavelli's, The Prince), available at http://www.eff.comIP/P2P/
MGM vGrokster/20030917_grokster.appeal-brief.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2003).
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443

network represents a way for less mainstream artists to have an
audience, which actually furthers the goals of copyright law and
American ideals in general. 4 36 The new technology promotes a bottomup approach to musical tastes, allowing listeners to dictate demand,
rather than demand being determined by MTV or popular radio. 437 The
goal of copyright law and intellectual property law is to encourage
innovation, not to protect any particular business model.4 3 8
Also, the Internet and peer-to-peer networks will make distribution
and marketing cheaper.4 39 Thus, as law is moving to increase copyright
protections, through third-party liability, anti-circumvention provisions,
and the rights to control digital reproduction, the practical use is moving
in the opposite direction: copyright holders need less protection because
their craft is now less cost prohibitive. 440 Furthermore, some argue that
record companies have attempted to limit use of the new technology as
a means to secure and perpetuate the continuation of their current
adept at promoting
business model.4 4 1 Instead, true competition is more
44 2
innovative business models and content diversity.
In short, the Grokster court correctly applied the staple article of
of substantial noninfringing
commerce doctrine, finding the existence
44 3
uses inherent in the file-trading software.
B. The Knowledge Prong of ContributoryLiability
The Grokster and Aimster courts differed on how specific the
defendants' knowledge must be to satisfy this element of contributory
liability. 44 4 The Grokster court correctly required greater specificity

436. Fagin et al., supra note 163, at 504-11 (explaining how peer-to-peer networks diversify
listeners' exposure to new artists in a desirable manner).
437. ld.at510-11.
438. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of copyright law,
and the need to achieve meaningful balance between protection of individual property interests
and public benefit).
439. Fagin et al., supra note 163, at 495.
440. Id. at 503-04.
441. Id. at 491 ("[T]he existing industry structure should not dictate technological
development.").
442. Id.
443. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
444. Id. The Aimster court did not develop a line of reasoning as to what level of knowledge
should be required. Instead it stated in conclusory form, tucked away in a parenthetical, that
constructive knowledge would be sufficient. Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003)
("Willful blindness is knowledge, in copyright law (where indeed it may be enough that the
defendant should have known of the direct infringement. .. ), as it is in the law generally.").
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than the Aimster court. 445 The district court in Aimster noted that
44 6
specific knowledge had never been required to affix liability.
As a general matter, either actual or constructive knowledge may
447
satisfy the element of knowledge and establish contributory liability.
If the software fulfills the staple article of commerce requirements, then
448
constructive knowledge may not implicate contributory liability.
However, would the Supreme Court have resolved Sony differently if
Sony had had actual knowledge that a particular person was using a
Betamax for copyright infringement? 44 9 A different result seems
unlikely when one considers the policy implications underlying the
staple article of commerce doctrine. 4 50 Indeed, the Aimster court
postulated that the Napster court erred on just that argument, instead
determining that Sony does not make knowledge alone a condition
45 1
sufficient to establish contributory liability.
Furthermore, within the context of the Netcom case, for knowledge to
45 2
trigger liability, it must coincide with the ability to effect a change.
Therefore, if accepted, the Netcom holding necessitates that knowledge
must be specific, because to know as a general matter that infringement
exists (constructive knowledge) does not leave the defendant with the
ability to curb the infringement. 453 The rationale behind this rule is
axiomatic. 45 4 When examining real-world conditions, it makes sense to

445. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
446. Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 651 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
447. See NIMMER, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 47, § 1:32 (explaining the
knowledge element of contributory liability). Constructive knowledge is sufficient to establish
contributory liability. Id.
448. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
449. See id. at 417 (rationalizing the application of the staple article of commerce doctrine).
450. See supra notes 402-04 and accompanying text (explaining the rationale behind the
staple article of commerce doctrine).
451. Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643,649(7th Cir. 2003).
452. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1373-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also supra note 144 and accompanying text (explaining the
Netcom court's rationale for the rule that knowledge must coincide with the ability to act on such
information). The Netcom decision is binding on the Ninth Circuit to the extent that it was
adopted by the Napster court, but is only persuasive authority in the Seventh Circuit. See notes
184-185 and accompanying text (outlining Napster's analysis of the knowledge element and the
court's application of the high-threshold test from Netcom).
453. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373-74; see also supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text
(explaining the Netcom court's approach to the knowledge element, specifically that actual
knowledge at a time when the defendant may do something about the infringement is a condition
precedent for a finding of contributory liability). But see Grokster Ruling Sparks Reaction, supra
note 402 (quoting copyright attorney Prager, that when tools are "primarily [used for]
infringement," then "case-by-case knowledge" is not necessary).
454. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373-74.
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is
require actual knowledge rather than constructive knowledge since it
45 5
activities.
online
monitor
to
providers
service
for
practice
in
difficult
Finally, the Aimster court noted that Aimster's encryption
4 56
technology, voluntarily imposed, cannot shield it from liability.
However, the Grokster court determined that although Grokster may
have purposefully structured its company to avoid liability, the law
necessitated a particular answer. 457 The Grokster court correctly
deferred to Congress to change the law based on its unwillingness to
expand copyright protections without legislative guidance. 4 58 Aimster
did not have knowledge of specific acts of infringement and,
particularly within the realm of Classic Aimster, was not in a position to
4 59
effect a change.
Furthermore, the law indicates that the providers of such services
need not police or monitor their networks since actual knowledge
triggers liability, not the failure to exercise the ability to discover
infringement. 460 Although the two concepts are not identical, ISP
liability and peer-to-peer software distributor liability are somewhat
analogous. 46 1 Congress chose to excuse service providers from liability
that the safe harbors
for the activities of their users, despite the fact
462
remove the incentive to monitor their networks.

455. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). The Napster
court relied on Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
("recognizing that online service provider[s] do[ ] not and cannot examine every hyperlink for
potentially defamatory material").
456. Aimster H, 334 F.3d at 650.
457. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
458. Id.
To justify a judicial remedy, however, Plaintiffs invite this Court to expand
existing copyright law beyond its well-drawn boundaries. As the Supreme Court has
observed, courts must tread lightly in circumstances such as these:
The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright
without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring theme. Sound policy, as well
as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major
technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials....
In a case like this, in which Congress had not plainly marked our course, we
must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by legislative
enactment which never calculated such a calculus of interests.
Id. (citations omitted).
459. Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 650 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (stressing the significance of Club
Aimster); id. at 651 (noting that specific knowledge is not required). The Seventh Circuit did not
address the level of specificity required, but was adamant that willful blindness met the
knowledge requirement. See Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 650.
460. See supra Part II.E. 1 (discussing safe harbors).
461. Fagin et a]., supra note 163, at 570.
462. See infra Part IV.D (analyzing safe harbor provisions).
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Therefore, the knowledge element necessitates actual knowledge
in the
within the auspices of the Netcom holding and by implication
46 3
Sony decision, lending credence to the Groksterrationale.
C. Vicarious Liability
The Aimster and Grokster courts both determined that the defendants
received financial benefit from the infringing activities. 4 64 Even in
Grokster, in which the end users did not pay a monthly fee for the

services, the court noted that the infringing activity acted as a draw for
downloading the software. 46 5 The courts were correct in finding a
because part of the service's
financial benefit from the infringement
4 66
appeal was the prospect of free music.
However, the two courts differed in their findings of control.4 6 7 The
Grokster court found no ability to supervise, even if the company could
4 68
have made software modifications to restrict copyrighted materials.
The Grokster court properly applied the facts as they were; it did not
consider an obligation to supervise if able, which was an important
distinction. 469 The Aimster court relied on Club Aimster in 4its
70
determination that Aimster retained control over its customers.
Based on the facts, the Aimster court was also correct, but absent the
existence of Club Aimster, the same decision would not have
resulted. 4 7 1 Thus, file-trading activities do not implicate the control
472
element of vicarious liability.
463. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1373-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 437-39 (1984) (outlining knowledge element of contributory liability); supra note 144 and
accompanying text (explaining the Netcom court's rationale for the rule that knowledge must
coincide with the ability to act on such information).
464. Aimster H, 334 F.3d at 652; MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029,
1044 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
465. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1044.
466. See supra notes 19, 195 and accompanying text (discussing Internet piracy on the Web).
467. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1044-45; Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 648 (recognizing that
because Aimster is a service with a continuing relationship with its customers, it "should be able
to prevent, or at least limit, their infringing copyright by monitoring their use of the service and
terminating them when it is discovered that they are infringing"). The appellate court in Aimster
did not analyze control as an element of contributory liability per se, but did determine that a
continuing relationship with clients was a factor to be considered in the analysis because of some
implicit control retained by Aimster. Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 648.
468. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
469. See id. (imposing no affirmative obligation on the party to supervise).
470. Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 648.
471. See id. (noting that requiring a user name and password tended to show supervision and
control).
472. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
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D. Safe Harbor

The Grokster court, having determined that the defendants were not
liable for infringement, had no cause to evaluate the safe harbor
provisions. 4 73 The safe harbor provisions produce a counterintuitive
result, as exemplified in Aimster.474 The court refused to qualify
Aimster for the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor because no
materials passed through its servers. 4 75 On the spectrum of culpability,
however, a company that does not utilize centralized systems to transfer
information should be less culpable
than a company that does because
47 6
involvement.
decreased
of its
The Aimster court also determined that Aimster did not qualify for
safe harbor because it had not reasonably implemented a repeat
copyright infringer policy. 477
Merely having the policy without
effectuating its purpose did not meet the requirements of the DMCA
safe harbor shelter. 47 8 The Aimster court was not persuaded by
Aimster's argument that it did not have the ability to monitor the
networks. 4 79 According to the district court in Aimster, reasonable
implementation of the policy would necessitate the ability to monitor
4 80
the networks to gain knowledge as to specific infringers' activities.
This standard is overly harsh when contrasted with the control element
of vicarious liability. 48 1 The control element, as interpreted, allowed for
the contractual retention of a right to terminate a user, without any
showing of an ability to control, to satisfy the element. 48 2 Words,
without the corollary ability to effectuate their meaning, either should

473. Id. at 1031, 1043, 1046.
474. Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 655.
475. Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 659 (N.D. I11.2002). The appellate court addressed the
safe harbor provisions by examining the threshold requirement of a policy to prevent repeat
infringement only. Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 655. Although both courts reached the conclusion that
Aimster could not qualify for safe harbor protection because it failed to implement a policy to
prevent repeat infringement, the district court analyzed each of the safe harbors in turn, as though
Aimster could potentially qualify. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
476. Cf Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information
Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 390 (1995) (providing policy reasons against imposing copyright liability
on bulletin board operators, prior to enactment of the DMCA safe harbor provisions).
477. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 658.
478. Id. at 658-59. The appellate court did not specifically analyze the policy, finding it
sufficient that Aimster encouraged infringement through its website, rather than working to
eliminate infringement. Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 655.
479. Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
480. Id.
481. See Wright, supra note 63, at 1026 (advocating a narrower definition of control).
482. See supra note 76 (discussing the evolution of the control element of vicarious liability).

448
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be: 1) sufficient to prove implementation of the direct infringers' policy

and therefore allow for application of the safe harbor provisions; or 2)
insufficient to show a right and ability to supervise the network, and
483
therefore should not result in a finding of vicarious liability.
Ultimately, the Grokster court correctly determined that file-sharing
software deserves protection under the staple article of commerce
doctrine, and that for contributory liability to be imposed justly, the
party must have actual and specific knowledge of the infringing
activities. 4 84 Additionally, the Grokster court correctly found a lack of
basis for the imposition of vicarious liability. 4 85 Finally, the safe harbor
provisions, as analyzed by the Aimster court, represent an inconsistent
determination of control. 4 86 In short, file-trading software provides
noninfringing benefits to the community that outweigh some infringing
use.

48 7

V.

PROPOSAL

legal. 48 8

File-swapping tools are
However, this reality does not leave
copyright holders without the ability to protect their intellectual
property. 4 89
Instead, copyright holders must utilize available
technology and should tailor their marketing and business models to
reflect the reality of a world with file-swapping software. 4 90 They also
must hold accountable the individuals who directly infringe on their
copyrights. 49 1 This Part first explores the practical avenues available to
copyright holders, suggesting business models and a campaign to
change public perception. 492
Next, this Part advocates holding
individuals accountable for their direct infringement activities. 4 93 This
Part then examines the legal framework and its support role in copyright

483. See 17 U.S.C. § 510 (2000) (requiring implementation of infringement policy for safe
harbor protection); Wright, supra note 63, at 1012.
484. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
485. Id. at 1046.
486. Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643, 659 (7th Cir. 2003).
487. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
488. See supra Parts III.B., IV (examining the Grokster decision and urging that its
interpretation is correct).
489. See infra Part V (providing strategies to copyright holders to protect their intellectual
property).
490. See Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at CIO ("[S]tuffing the technology genie back in the
bottle is not the solution.").
491. See infra Part V.B (discussing individual accountability).
492. See infra Part V.A (surveying real-world solutions available to copyright holders).
493. See infra Part V.B (contending that individual accountability is essential to copyright
protection).
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disputes. 494 Finally, this Part concludes by proposing guidelines for
4 95
potential future legislation.
A. PracticalSolutions: Business and Education
The music industry is beginning to recognize the need to embrace
technology and work with the creators of technology, in an effort to
help eliminate piracy and to exploit the Internet as an inexpensive
distribution alternative. 4 96 The music industry has attempted various
fee-based distribution models, a concept that is continuing to evolve
despite early failures. 49 7 One cited reason for the failure of these
legitimate and sanctioned distribution schemes is limited selection and a
failure to release the most recent and desirable tracks. 49 8 Some doubt
that legitimate subscription services will ever be effective, citing the

common-sense argument that a company
cannot charge a price for
4 99

.
something others give away for free.
Yet, Professor Doris Estelle Long suggests some tactics both to
succeed in the online distribution business and reduce piracy. 50 0 Long

494. See infra Part V.C (discussing the legal framework underlying enforcement of copyright
laws).
495. See infra Part V.D (offering strategies for future legislation).
496. Press Release, Rep. Howard L. Berman, Berman Lauds Agreement Between Recording
Industry and Technology Companies (Jan. 14, 2003) (referring approvingly to an agreement
between the RIAA and the Business Software Alliance and Computer Systems Policy Project,
calling the relationship between copyright and the creators of technology "symbiotic"), available
at http://www.house.gov/appslist/press/ca28_berman/riaa-bsa-agreement.html (last visited Dec.
23, 2003).
497. Frank Ahrens, Real Networks, Like Apple, Starts Online Song Service, WASH. POST,
May 29, 2003, at E-01, availableat 2003 WL 55934830. Apple Computers started iTunes Music
Store, providing a 200,000-song selection, available to download for ninety-nine cents each. Id.
Real Networks offered a similar service, with 330,000 songs at seventy-nine cents each, with a
$9.95 monthly subscription fee. Id. Rob Glasner, chairman of Real Networks, reportedly talked
to Steve Jobs, chief executive of Apple, agreeing that they "need to get consumers to see the
benefit of legitimate music services." Id. Earlier attempts by the recording industry, like
MusicNet (owned by AOL and others), Pressplay (joint venture between Universal Music Group
and Sony Music Entertainment), "met with critical scorn and consumer indifference." Id. This is
because they were not easy to use, the song selections were limited, and the songs were often
rented rather than sold. Id. The services offered by Apple and Real Networks are the first real
viable options. Id.
498. Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at CI I (referring to Pressplay and MusicNet).
499. Id. (quoting skeptics of the music subscription business model who say that "[n]o one
can compete against free").
500. Long, supra note 2, at 784 (stating that the Internet "offers opportunities for developing
new distribution methods that take advantage of its economies of scale and access"). Long
suggests three business models: 1) the "Internet Promotion Model," which "[o]ffer[s] works over
the Internet for free or markedly reduced prices in order to promote hard goods sales of the
works"; 2) the "Internet Distribution Model," which "[o]ffer[s] copyrighted works over the
Internet through digital ordering or subscription services"; and finally, 3) the "Value Added
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first argues that online distribution businesses must overcome the
public's expectations of free music. 501 Also, the music industry should
offer alternatives to the public that are more appealing to the public than
pirated materials. 50 2 By lowering prices and increasing music selection,
which may be achieved through increased cross-licensing, the music
industry may be able to overcome it's early failures at online
distribution. 50 3 Furthermore, the distributors need not be the record
companies themselves, for third parties may be able to develop

legitimate distribution channels with the cooperation of the music
50 4
industry.
Educational initiatives, aimed at educating the public as a whole of
the risks associated with infringing behavior, also serve as a practical
solution to piracy. 50 5 To be successful, the music industry must
overcome the current consumer mindset that there is nothing wrong
with downloading music files-that it is a victimless crime. 50 6 The
record industry should argue that fairness dictates that artists receive

Model," which "[c]reat[es] value-added products in the hard goods world that make pirate
versions less desirable." Id. at 784-85.
501. Id. at 786 (referring to the "Internet Distribution Model" and outlining challenges
associated with introducing fee-based services, most notably overcoming the public's expectation
of free music).
502. Stefanie Olsen, Metallica Strikes New Net Chord, CNET NEWS.COM, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-1012785.html. (last modified June 3, 2003). Even Metallica,
once a vocal enemy of online music distribution and party to the Napster suit, reportedly
launched a website promoting free downloads of its songs to customers who buy its CD. Id.
Metallica's website is at www.metallicavault.com. Id. Other musicians are attempting similar
utilizations of web distribution; for example Madonna sold her "American Life" single on her
website, www.madonna.com. Id.
503. Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at CII (indicating that if the music industry would "loosen its
grip over music," then industry-sponsored or -sanctioned subscription services offer "hope for the
future").
504. See E-mail from The Napster Team to author (June 20, 2003) (on file with author)
(stating that "[o]ur goal is to bring you the best music site in the world while at the same time
respect the artists who created the music we all love"). (The e-mail was received upon registering
for updates on the progress of Napster at www.napster.com.) The record companies have not
traditionally owned radio stations or retail establishments where music is sold, so Fagin argues
that there is no need for the record companies to own or run online distribution channels. Fagin
et al., supra note 163, at 490-91.
505. Mousley, supra note 12, at 668, 686-88 (arguing that changing societal perceptions
about copyright infringement is theoretically the best means to fight piracy, but it faces
substantial challenges and may never become reality).
506. Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at C 11; see also EDISON MEDIA RESEARCH, NATIONAL
RECORD BUYERS STUDY II (June 10, 2002) (citing survey results that found that 22% of people
between 12 and 44 agreed that one no longer has to buy CDs because one can download music
for free, and that 74% of people aged 12 to 17 agree that there is nothing morally wrong with
downloading music for free), available at http://www.edisonresearch.com/Microsoft%20Word
%20-%20RecordBuyers2.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2003).
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compensation for their work; the simplicity and general appeal of this
argument should make the educational aspect effective. 507 To that end,
the music industry recently launched a print, radio and television
50 8
campaign enlisting the help of Britney Spears and Eminem.

Ultimately, the music industry must compensate for the evolving market
conditions resulting from technological innovation
and avail itself of
50 9
available marketing and educational options.
B. IndividualAccountability
Copyright holders may sue the individuals who utilize file-swapping
software to infringe. 5 10 The RIAA has begun utilizing this option 5 1 1 by
electing to sue some college students in April 2003.512 If the decision

507. Reuters, Music Industry Goes on Offensive To Push Downloads (May 21, 2003),
available at http://in.tech.yahoo.com/030521/137/24h71.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2003). The
music industry recognizes the need to combat public perceptions that copyright infringement is a
victimless crime. Id. To combat the widespread misconceptions, the music industry is utilizing
cyberspace in its own way, launching a new website, www.ProMusic.org, aimed at promoting
fee-based services and meeting the industry's educational goals. Id. The campaign was launched
by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, a global trade group representing
many music labels, including Warner Music, Universal Music, EMI, Sony Music, and BMG. Id.
The premise that artists should be compensated for their work is axiomatic and has general
appeal, as no one works for free. Id.
508. Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at CI. Critics fear that fans will not view rich,
multimillionaire recording artists sympathetically. Id.
509. Id.
510. Grokster Ruling Sparks Reaction, supra note 402 (noting that critics disagree as to
propriety of the Grokster result, but agree that the decision will likely result in more suits against
the end users). Digital piracy carries criminal penalties, both monetary fines and imprisonment.
17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000 & West Supp. 2003) (criminalizing
digital piracy). There are four elements to the charge of digital piracy: 1) a valid copyright, 2)
that was infringed, 3) willfully, and 4) threshold amounts sold or offered for distribution (required
for some felony convictions). Long, supra note 2, at 797. For digital piracy to be considered a
felony, the defendant must have made or distributed at least ten copies, commercially valued at
more than $2500, within a 180-day period. Id.
511. Lisa M. Bowman, RIAA Warns Individual Swappers, CNET NEWS.COM, at
http://www.news.com.comI2100-1027_3-1019184.html (June 19, 2003).
This strategy has
succeeded in slowing down P2P activity, with traffic on Kazaa down 41%. Reuters, Traffic on
P2P Services Down After Lawsuits - Data (Sept. 30, 2003), availableat http://in.tech.yahoo.coml
031001/137/284i6.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2003).
512. GroksterRuling Sparks Reaction, supra note 402. That suit against four college students
resulted in a settlement, requiring each student to pay between $12,000 and $17,000. Bowman,
supra note 511. Perhaps a testament to the popularity of online music piracy, one of the students
was able to collect the full $12,000 he owed through donations solicited online. Jefferson
Graham, Fined Student Gets Donations to Tune of $12K, USA TODAY, June 25, 2003, available
at 2003 WL 5314115. In a similar suit, the RIAA sought compensation from college students in
a streaming music suit that resulted in a settlement requiring college radio stations and
educational broadcasters to pay a $250 flat fee, a fee substantially lower than usually assessed to
commercial enterprises. Reuters, Music Industry, Schools Agree Webcasting Rate (June 3, 2003),
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in Grokster withstands appeal, then the music industry has few options
other than to sue the individuals directly responsible for the
infringement.5 13
The music industry, however, has been reluctant to select this course
of action for fear of alienating its customer base.5 14 Also, given that the
average individual user engages in this behavior for private use, not
profit, those users will make particularly sympathetic defendants,
especially compared to the record labels and other large commercial
enterprises. 5 15 Furthermore, successful lawsuits are expensive, and
given the dispersed nature of the activities and the potentially shallow
pockets of the users, the music industry questions the efficacy of such
individual suits. 516
However, the direct approach has distinct advantages, including
confronting the party whose behavior is most culpable-the one
actually stealing the music. 5 17 Furthermore, the lawsuits will change
the users' perceptions that there are no legal risks associated with their
behavior. 5 18 This should have a deterrent effect, and therefore a few
cases would provide adequate warning and decrease the prevalence of
the behavior. 5 19 Moreover, successful prosecution of prudently selected
defendants, who steal large volumes of copyrighted materials, may
reduce the availability of music on those networks. 520 Finally, the
industry must work to change perceptions about the crime of online
theft, including availing itself of the legal system and thus capitalizing
on the deterrent effect.

available at http://www.forbes.com/markets/newswire/2003/06/03/rtr990147.htm
(last visited
Nov. 23, 2003).
513. Bowman, supra note 511 (quoting Hilary Rosen, CEO of RIAA, in response to the
Grokster decision, stating that "individual infringers cannot expect to remain anonymous when
they engage in this illegal activity").
514. Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at CIO. But see Long, supra note 2, at 806 (finding it
difficult to reconcile the fear of alienating a potential customer with illegal downloaded files).
515. Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at CIO.
516. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW, supra note 51, § 4:53 (stating that "enforcement against
individuals does not provide a viable remedy").
517. Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at C 10.
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Id.
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C. The Legal Framework

The law should provide the framework for allowing a successful and
meaningful defense of copyrights by artists. 52 1 Currently, the DMCA
accomplishes this goal through its subpoena provision, facilitating suits
against individuals responsible for file-trading, and through its anticircumvention provisions, supporting technological measures used to
52 2
protect copyrights.
1. DMCA Fast-Track Subpoena Provision
One example of this support role of the law is the DMCA fast-track
subpoena provision, which provides for an expedited track to compel
ISPs to reveal names of suspected copyright infringers. 523 The RIAA
successfully employed this provision, obtaining the identities of some
Verizon users despite constitutional concerns. 524 More recently, the
RIAA controversially utilized the same provision to compel service
providers and universities, including Loyola University Chicago, to
surrender the names of additional alleged file-traders.5 25 Although
some have criticized Loyola's compliance with the subpoena provision,

521. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (stating
the need to offer "effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly").
522. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(h), 1201(a)-(b) (2000).
523. Id. § 512(h). The statutory provision provides in pertinent part:
(h) Subpoena to identify infringer.
(1) Request. A copyright owner or a person authorized to act on the owner's
behalf may request the clerk of any United States district court to issue a subpoena to a
service provider for identification of an alleged infringer in accordance with this
subsection.
(3) Contents of subpoena. The subpoena shall authorize and order the service
provider receiving the notification and the subpoena to expeditiously disclose to the
copyright owner or person authorized by the copyright owner information sufficient to
identify the alleged infringer of the material described in the notification to the extent
such information is available to the service provider.
(5) Actions of service provider receiving subpoena. Upon receipt of the issued
subpoena, either accompanying or subsequent to the receipt of a notification described
in subsection (c)(3)(A), the service provider shall expeditiously disclose to the
copyright owner or person authorized by the copyright owner the information required
by the subpoena, notwithstanding any other provision of law and regardless of whether
the service provider responds to the notification.
Id.
524. In re Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 275 (D.D.C. 2003) (upholding 17
U.S.C. § 512(h)); Bowman, supra note 511.
525. Foster, supra note 3; Music Industry Goes After Students, supra note 5.
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that
school officials carefully evaluated their position and determined
52 6
subpoena.
the
of
terms
the
by
abide
to
bound
legally
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2. Anti-Circumvention Provisions
The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA 527 represent a big
step in the direction of the law working with, rather than against,
technology. 52 8 The provisions allow copyright holders to develop
technology to protect their intellectual property. 529 Although many past

526. Anthony D'Amato, Loyola Hits Sour Note in Naming Students in Net Music Case, Nw.
L. NEWS (July 28, 2003), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/inthenewsl
article-full.cfm?eventid=920&pagetype='current' (last visited Nov. 18, 2003). According to an
article giving Loyola's perspective:
"We take these things seriously," said the Rev. Richard Salmi, the university's vice
president of student affairs....
Salmi said the two students, who have not been identified, share a dorm room and
are currently enrolled in summer school. He said their Internet access has been
terminated pending the outcome of the university's disciplinary proceedings.
"It's a Catholic university," Salmi said. "What you're trying to help students to
understand is that there are ethical uses of the Internet and there are unethical [uses of
the Internet]."
Music Industry Goes After Students, supra note 5.
Loyola University Chicago has posted the university's DMCA policy on its website. LOYOLA
at
ACT
POLICY,
MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT
UNIV.
CHI.,
DIGITAL
http://www.luc.edulinfotechlcease/dmcaldmca-policy.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2003). The
university is committed to educating its students regarding copyright infringement, and drafted a
"Statement to be Read to Residents by Residence Life Staff' to that end. Statement from Loyola
University Chicago Residence Hall Staff, to incoming residents (n.d.) (on file with author). The
statement warns students of the stiff civil and criminal penalties that may result from copyright
infringement, notes the RIAA's increasingly aggressive posture, and states that Loyola is
"[unlable to help [students] if [they] should be brought into federal court for violation of federal
copyright laws." Id. The statement further urges students passionate about the issue of filetrading to get involved in the political dialogue, and provides information to students on available
resources and discussion forums. Id.
The strategy and basis for the statement emerged from the American Council on Education.
See Michael J. Remington, Background Discussion of Copyright Law and Potential Liability for
Students Engaged in P2P File Sharing on University Networks (Aug. 8, 2003) (stating its
intended purpose of aiding university administrators in understanding problems arising from P2P
file sharing), available at http://www.acenet.edu/washington/legalupdate/2003/P2P.pdf (last
visited Dec. 23, 2003). A portion of the report reads:
Colleges and universities are under no legal obligation to defend, or accept
responsibility for, the illegal actions of their students in the P2P context. A major step
toward ending unlawful P2P activities on college and university campuses lies in
education. Ultimately, it is important for institutions to provide information about
students' rights and responsibilities with regard to copyrighted works on P2P services.
Id.
527. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), (b) (2000).
528. Ruthenberg, supra note 160, § 6.88 (characterizing DMCA's three anti-circumvention
provisions as "providing the legal framework to support enabling technologies").
529. Id.
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attempts at technological protection of copyrights have failed, the
industry should not throw in the towel. 530 One technological measure
that could help the music industry avail itself of the anti-circumvention
53 1
provisions is known as digital rights management ("DRM").
Additionally, encryption technology may allow the protection of
copyrighted material, making it harder for a would-be pirate to obtain a
Finally, watermarking is another helpful technology. 533
file. 5 32
Watermarking will not prevent the illegal copying of a file, but may
help identify offending files, which will aid in the prosecution of an
individual infringer. 5 34 These represent permissible levels of self-help,
as opposed to the possibly debilitating ones 35
currently employed, such as
5
virus.
computer
a
containing
file
the decoy
D. Possible FutureLegislation
Congress may elect to legislate specifically on the topic of filetrading or peer-to-peer networks, an option explicitly outlined by Judge
Wilson's opinion in Grokster.53 6 Congress has considered but failed to
pass several provisions to address this issue. 53 7 Should Congress elect
530. Id. (stating that CDs thought to be protected against copying were easily converted to
MP3 files after individuals drew a line on each disc with a felt-tip marker). More recently,
SunnComm Technologies, Inc. developed a mechanism to prevent copying CDs, but the measure
can be circumvented by pressing the shift key to disable the encryption software. Reuters, CD
Copy
Protection Trumped by
Shift Key,
CNN.COM,
at http://www.cnn.coml
2003/rECH/ptech/10/08/bmg.protection.reut/index.html (Oct. 8, 2003). Last year, one failed
legislative push would have required agreement on one particular DRM standard. Iser & Toma,
supra note 8, at C10 (referring to the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act
introduced by Senator Fritz Hollings, Democrat from South Carolina).
531. Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at CIO. See generally TECHWEB, supra note 363, for a
definition of DRM.
532. Long, supra note 2, at 788.
533. Id. Watermarking is a digital identification technique, marking the applicable file with
copyright information. Id.
534. Id. Watermarking has value, not in preventing the file from being copied, but instead as
evidence in civil suits or criminal prosecutions against alleged copyright infringers. Id.
Furthermore, although "pirates have the know-how to break copy protection technologies, they
often pay little attention to digital identification markers." Id.
535. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (discussing self-help measures currently
employed).
536. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
Currently, three House members are creating a new Congressional caucus to address Internet
piracy and stronger intellectual property laws. Declan McCullagh, Congressional Caucus
Targets Piracy,CNET NEWS.COM, at http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-1007908.html (May 19,
2003). Congress has introduced legislation on behalf of intellectual property holders in the past
to allow for self-help. Id.
537. Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at Cl (noting that the RIAA and the technology industry both
opposed legislation mandating copy protection in computer hardware and software); Amy
Harmon, Music Industry Won't Seek Government Aid on Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 15, 2003, at
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to take action, it should do so in a manner conducive to future
technological innovation in order to be consistent with the constitutional
objectives of copyright law. 538 Furthermore, it should seek to promote
innovative market solutions and foster cooperation, not divisiveness,
5 39
between the music and technology industries.
The music industry must adapt to a change in the economic climate
of the industry, as effected by technological innovation. 540 Copyright
owners maintain meaningful copyright protection through 1) revised
business and educational strategies; 2) the legal framework, which
allows suits to hold individuals accountable; and 3) technological
measures as protected by anti-circumvention provisions. 54 1 Should
Congress choose to legislate on this issue, it must balance the copyright
owners' interests in their intellectual property rights with the public
interest in both the copyrighted material and technological
54 2
innovation.
VI. CONCLUSION

American intellectual property law rewards innovation, whether in
science or technology or arts. File-swapping software is one incarnation
of technological innovation, deserving of both protection and praise. It
promises social benefits not only in the form of improved access to
information but also by offering alternatives to traditional marketing
and business practices for the astute entrepreneur. Despite initial
tensions between file-trading technologies and copyright holders, the
author remains optimistic that copyright holders may protect their
intellectual property in an online context, while still allowing
technological innovation to flourish.

C3, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File. Another potential legal
solution, championed by Representative Howard L. Berman, Democrat from California, is the
Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act. H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. § l(a) (2002), available at
http://www.thomas.loc.gov (last visited Dec. 23, 2003). See generally Ruthenberg, supra note
160, § 6:108.40 (outlining the attributes of the Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act).
538. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing
the Constitutional grant of copyright protection).
539. Fagin et al., supra note 163, at 491.
540. See Iser & Toma, supra note 8, at C 11 (explaining that the file-trading technology cannot
be stifled to protect music industry interests).
541. Long, supra note 2, at 784, 788, 806.
542. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing
the Constitutional grant of copyright protection).

